Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1996, when Riley was sixteen, he and two older teenagers drove around the District of Columbia looking for members of a rival group and ended up shooting and killing two young brothers. A few weeks earlier, Riley and the same teenagers had committed a similar crime in Maryland, resulting in another death. Riley pled guilty to first-degree murder in Maryland and was sentenced to life in prison. In D.C., a jury convicted him of two counts of first-degree murder while armed, assault with intent to kill while armed, and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence. He received sentences totaling seventy years to life, consecutive to his Maryland sentence.Riley's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In 2022, he filed a motion under the Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act (IRAA) seeking immediate release, arguing his rehabilitation and readiness to reenter society. The government did not oppose a sentence reduction but suggested a term of twelve years to life. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and partially granted Riley's motion, reducing his sentence to time served plus three years and three months, relying on factors from the District’s determinate sentencing statute and voluntary sentencing guidelines.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred by relying on non-IRAA statutes and factors, contrary to the recent decision in Doe v. United States. The court held that IRAA’s enumerated factors should exclusively guide the dangerousness and interests of justice inquiries. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with IRAA’s statutory framework and the Doe decision. View "Riley v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute within the Unification Church, also known as the Unification Movement, following a schism and succession conflict. The plaintiffs, including the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International, filed a complaint in 2011 against defendants, including Unification Church International (UCI) and its president, Hyun Jin (Preston) Moon. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in actions contrary to the church's mission, including amending UCI's articles of incorporation and transferring assets to entities like the Kingdom Investments Foundation (KIF) and the Global Peace Foundation (GPF).The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the defendants' actions were inconsistent with UCI's original purposes. However, the court's decision was reversed on appeal in Moon III, where it was held that resolving the plaintiffs' claims would require deciding disputed religious questions, making them nonjusticiable under the First Amendment's religious abstention doctrine. The case was remanded for further proceedings.On remand, the trial court dismissed the remaining claims with prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked special interest standing to pursue their self-dealing claims against Preston Moon after Moon III, as the claims no longer involved extraordinary measures threatening UCI's existence. The court also determined that the contract claims were nonjusticiable under the religious abstention doctrine, as resolving them would require interpreting religious terms and doctrines. The court declined to apply the potential fraud or collusion exception to the religious abstention doctrine, finding no evidence of bad faith for secular purposes.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's orders, agreeing that the plaintiffs' claims were nonjusticiable and that they lacked special interest standing. The court also upheld the trial court's decision to deny the plaintiffs' motion to reopen discovery, finding no abuse of discretion. The litigation, which spanned over a decade, was thereby brought to a close. View "Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International v. Moon" on Justia Law

Mark Stubblefield was charged with multiple offenses related to two separate bank robberies in October and November 2022. He was tried for the October robbery, where he was accused of armed robbery and making threats. The jury found him guilty of both charges. Subsequently, Stubblefield pled guilty to a robbery charge related to the November incident.In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Stubblefield was convicted of armed robbery and threats for the October robbery. He later entered a guilty plea for the November robbery. The plea agreement included a waiver of his right to appeal the convictions, but it was ambiguous whether this waiver applied to the October convictions. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment for the October and November offenses and informed him of his right to appeal the jury trial convictions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court concluded that the plea agreement was ambiguous regarding the waiver of appellate rights for the October convictions and allowed the appeal to proceed. On the merits, the court found that the evidence was insufficient to support the armed robbery conviction. The government failed to prove that Stubblefield was actually armed with a bomb or that the bank tellers subjectively believed he had a bomb. The court reversed the armed robbery conviction and remanded for entry of a lesser included robbery conviction. The rest of Stubblefield's convictions were affirmed. View "Stubblefield v. United States" on Justia Law

A police cruiser driven by Officer Dallas Bennett collided with a vehicle driven by Jeanne Dinga, with Rachelle Thorne and her children as passengers. Thorne and Dinga filed separate negligence suits against the District of Columbia, which were later consolidated. The District moved for summary judgment, arguing that Officer Bennett was on an "emergency run" under D.C. Code § 2-411(4), and thus could only be liable for gross negligence. The trial court granted the motions, finding that no reasonable juror could conclude that Officer Bennett was grossly negligent.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the District, concluding that Officer Bennett was on an emergency run and that no reasonable juror could find gross negligence. The court found that Officer Bennett believed he was responding to an emergency and acted pursuant to that belief at the time of the collision.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed in part. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Officer Bennett was not on an emergency run and that he acted with ordinary negligence. The court noted that Officer Bennett's testimony, the MPD General Orders, and the circumstances of the collision could lead a jury to conclude that he did not genuinely believe he was responding to an emergency. However, the court agreed with the trial court that no reasonable jury could find gross negligence based on the evidence presented. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Thorne v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Derek J. Morris was convicted of unlawful entry after refusing to leave the United States Supreme Court Clerk’s Office while attempting to file a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court has specific procedures for in-person filings, requiring documents to be delivered to the Supreme Court Police for security screening. Morris had previously been informed of these procedures but insisted on filing directly at the Clerk’s Office, leading to his arrest after multiple refusals to leave.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia instructed the jury using the model instruction for unlawful entry on public premises. Morris proposed an additional element to the instruction to clarify the need for an independent justification for the order to leave, but he later withdrew this request, agreeing that the existing instruction sufficed. The jury found Morris guilty based on the given instructions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case, focusing on whether the jury instruction adequately conveyed the requirement for an independent justification for the order to leave public property. The court held that the model instruction failed to clearly explain this requirement, constituting an error. However, the court determined that this error did not affect Morris’s substantial rights, as the parties’ arguments had sufficiently highlighted the need for an independent justification, and the evidence overwhelmingly supported the government’s case. Consequently, the court affirmed Morris’s conviction. View "Morris v. United States" on Justia Law

Rubin Delphonso Holman was convicted of robbery, assault with intent to rob (AWIR), and simple assault. The incident occurred on a Metro train where Holman and his friend, Mr. Black, engaged in inappropriate behavior towards Domini Dotson. After Dotson moved to another train car and reported the incident, Holman followed her, threatened her, and attempted to take her phone. When Dotson resisted, Holman assaulted her, and during the altercation, he took her phone. Holman later threw the phone onto the Metro tracks when approached by police.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted Holman of the charges. Holman appealed, arguing that his convictions for simple assault and AWIR should merge with his robbery conviction under the Double Jeopardy Clause. He also contended that there was insufficient evidence to support his robbery conviction.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court agreed with Holman that his convictions for simple assault and AWIR should merge with his robbery conviction, as robbery requires proof of assault, and thus, the lesser offenses are included within the greater offense of robbery. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Holman’s robbery conviction, as a reasonable jury could infer that Holman intended to permanently deprive Dotson of her phone.The Court of Appeals reversed Holman’s convictions for simple assault and AWIR, affirmed his robbery conviction, and remanded the case for entry of a new judgment and commitment order reflecting only the robbery conviction. The court noted that resentencing was unnecessary as the trial court had imposed concurrent sentences. View "Holman v. United States" on Justia Law

G.W. was taken into custody in the District of Columbia on a delinquency matter. Although released in that matter, the trial court ordered his detention under the Interstate Compact for Juveniles (ICJ) to be picked up by Virginia authorities on a different juvenile matter. When Virginia authorities did not take custody, the trial court dismissed the ICJ matter, but the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) continued to detain G.W., interpreting the ICJ to require detention until all of G.W.'s juvenile matters in the District were resolved or until Virginia took custody or consented to his release.G.W. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that DYRS had no authority under the ICJ to detain him once Virginia failed to take custody. DYRS opposed the petition, citing ICJ rules and an advisory opinion by the Interstate Commission for Juveniles. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the petition, relying on the advisory opinion that interpreted the ICJ rules to require detention until charges in the holding state were resolved or there was consent from the demanding state.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Since the trial court's ruling, the Commission withdrew the advisory opinion, and both the Commission and the District of Columbia conceded that the ICJ rules did not require G.W.'s detention. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that ICJ Rule 7-103 did not address detention and that ICJ Rule 6-102.2 required detention only until the demanding state returned the juvenile or the time period for doing so expired. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

Lauren and John Paul Szymkowicz, who live near Georgetown University, experienced secondhand smoke infiltrating their home from a neighboring property occupied by a Georgetown undergraduate student. The smoke caused health issues and discomfort for the couple. Despite their efforts to address the issue directly with the student and through various university channels, the problem persisted until the student was eventually relocated by the university.The Szymkowiczes filed a lawsuit against Georgetown University in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, asserting claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, public and private nuisance, and breach of contract. They argued that the university had a duty to mitigate the impacts of student behavior on the surrounding neighborhood, as outlined in Georgetown’s campus plan and the Zoning Commission’s order approving that plan. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that Georgetown owed no duty to the Szymkowiczes and that no contract existed between the university and the couple.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Georgetown University did not owe a duty of care to the Szymkowiczes under common law or based on the campus plan and Zoning Commission’s order. The court also found that the university was not in control of the student’s conduct and thus could not be held liable for nuisance. Additionally, the court determined that no enforceable contract existed between Georgetown and the District of Columbia that would allow the Szymkowiczes to sue for breach of contract. Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims. View "Szymkowicz v. President and Directors of the College of Georgetown University" on Justia Law

Darrell Jones was charged with assault with intent to kill (AWIK) while armed and related counts after repeatedly stabbing his friend, Wayne Pitt. Jones claimed self-defense and argued that his extreme intoxication, from consuming alcohol, marijuana, and PCP, precluded him from forming the specific intent to kill. The trial court precluded Jones from introducing evidence of his PCP use without expert testimony on the drug’s effects. Jones was convicted on all counts and appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding the PCP evidence.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia precluded Jones from presenting evidence of his PCP use, interpreting the case Jackson v. United States to mean that evidence of PCP use requires expert testimony. Jones argued that Jackson was inapplicable because it involved PCP use many hours before the incident, whereas he and Pitt used PCP shortly before the stabbing. The trial court denied Jones’s request to reconsider its ruling, and Jones was convicted by a jury.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in precluding evidence of Jones’s PCP use. The court held that the evidence was highly relevant to Jones’s intoxication defense and that there was no overriding unfair prejudice to the government. The court clarified that Jackson did not establish a categorical rule requiring expert testimony for PCP use evidence. The court vacated Jones’s AWIK while armed conviction but affirmed his other convictions for aggravated assault and carrying a dangerous weapon. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Jones v. United States" on Justia Law

Matthew Bare sued his former employer, Rainforest Alliance, Inc., in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that the company failed to pay him a redundancy settlement after his position was made redundant due to a reorganization. Bare claimed that he had agreed to resign in exchange for the settlement, which was contingent upon his execution of a release-of-claims agreement. However, after Bare made critical comments about the company, Rainforest Alliance terminated him and refused to pay the settlement, leading to claims of breach of contract and violation of the District of Columbia Wage Payment and Collection Law.The Superior Court dismissed Bare's complaint with prejudice, agreeing with Rainforest Alliance that Bare had failed to allege the occurrence of a condition precedent—specifically, the execution of a release agreement. The court found that without alleging this, Bare could not claim he had earned the redundancy payment under the contract or the wage law. Bare had argued that the issue of the condition precedent was a factual matter for summary judgment or trial and that Rainforest Alliance had waived the condition by not providing a release agreement. He also requested leave to amend his complaint if the motion to dismiss was granted.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court should have granted Bare's request to amend his complaint. The appellate court found that Bare's request to amend was his first, the case had been pending for a short time, there was no evidence of bad faith or dilatory motives, and there was no prejudice to Rainforest Alliance. The court also determined that Bare's proposed amendment, which would include allegations that Rainforest Alliance waived the condition precedent by not providing a release agreement, was not futile. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bare v. Rainforest Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law