Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Joseph Jackson, then twenty years old, was involved in a drug-related conflict in southeast Washington, D.C. After being told by a rival dealer, Larry Smith, that he could no longer sell drugs in the area, Jackson instructed his associate, Troy Ashley, to “handle that.” Ashley, with the help of Jason Parker, confronted Smith and his associates, resulting in Ashley shooting and killing Smith and robbing and shooting the other two men. Ashley and Parker reported back to Jackson, who expressed excitement and rewarded Parker with drugs. Jackson was subsequently convicted by a jury in 2003 of first-degree premeditated murder, armed robbery, and other offenses.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals previously affirmed Jackson’s convictions and remanded for merger of offenses and resentencing, after which Jackson received a thirty-five-year prison term. In 2023, Jackson moved in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for a sentence reduction under the Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act (IRAA), arguing that he had matured and was no longer dangerous. The government opposed, citing Jackson’s extensive record of violent and nonviolent disciplinary infractions during incarceration, including assaults and possession of contraband. The Superior Court found Jackson met the threshold for IRAA consideration but, after reviewing the statutory factors, determined that his continued infractions and lack of rehabilitation weighed against sentence reduction. The court denied the motion, finding Jackson remained a danger and that the interests of justice did not warrant modification.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that the Superior Court properly considered the relevant IRAA factors, including Jackson’s personal circumstances and role in the offense, and found no error in its analysis. The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying Jackson’s motion for sentence reduction. View "Jackson v. United States" on Justia Law

In October 2022, a man crashed his car into a parked vehicle in southeast Washington, D.C. After the collision, the car’s owner confronted him, and as police arrived, the man fled on foot. Officers pursued and apprehended him, discovering a gun with a large-capacity magazine under a vehicle along his escape route and another large-capacity magazine with ammunition inside his car. He was charged with several firearm-related offenses, including possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device and unlawful possession of ammunition.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss the large-capacity magazine charges on Second Amendment grounds and to suppress the evidence found at the scene, ruling that the search and seizure were justified. After a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition, both based on the magazine found in his car. He was acquitted of other charges. The defendant appealed, challenging the denial of suppression, the sufficiency of the evidence for the large-capacity magazine conviction, the lack of a jury instruction on knowledge, and the constitutionality of the statute.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. After oral argument, the government moved to vacate the large-capacity magazine conviction due to a change in its position on the statute’s constitutionality, which the court granted. The court affirmed the denial of suppression and upheld the unlawful possession of ammunition conviction, holding that the officers’ entry into the car to seize the magazine was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as they had probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of criminal activity. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Miller v. United States" on Justia Law

Steven Robin was observed by police at an apartment complex parking lot, where officers saw him grab his waistband and duck behind a parked car. Officers believed he had deposited a firearm under the vehicle, and subsequent surveillance and body camera footage supported this account. Robin was arrested, and a firearm was recovered from under the car. DNA testing showed Robin’s DNA on the firearm but not on the magazine. At trial, Robin argued that someone else had placed the firearm there or that officers had planted it, and he presented evidence suggesting improper police handling of the firearm.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over Robin’s trial. The judge instructed the jury that all exhibits except the firearm and ammunition would be available during deliberations, and that the firearm and ammunition could be examined only upon request, with a U.S. Marshal present for security. During deliberations, the jury requested to see the firearm, and the marshal brought it to the jury room. A juror asked if the magazine could be inserted into the gun, and the marshal either did so or allowed a juror to do so, but did not allow ammunition to be loaded. The jury conducted a demonstration with the firearm and found Robin guilty on all charges. After learning of these events, Robin moved for a new trial, arguing that the marshal’s interaction constituted impermissible ex parte communication and violated his constitutional rights. The trial judge denied the motion, finding the marshal’s actions ministerial and consistent with jury instructions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Robin forfeited his claims by failing to object to the jury instructions regarding the marshal’s role. The court found no plain error in the marshal’s conduct, concluding that the marshal’s actions were ministerial and did not require judicial oversight or party input. The court affirmed Robin’s convictions. View "Robin v. United States" on Justia Law

After a minor car accident outside a Safeway parking lot, Brittany Shantel Carrington and her three passengers, including her teenage daughter, became involved in a physical altercation with Brooklyn Brown and Marylynn Jones, the occupants of the other vehicle. The situation escalated from an exchange of insurance information to a brawl. During the fight, Carrington retrieved an umbrella from her car and, according to testimony, used it to strike the windshield of Brown’s vehicle and hit Jones, who sustained injuries. Police arrived and arrested Carrington, recovering the umbrella from her car.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over a bench trial. The trial judge found the facts surrounding the altercation unclear but ultimately credited Brown’s identification of Carrington as the person who broke the windshield and struck Jones with the umbrella. The court found Carrington’s account not credible and determined that she acted out of anger rather than self-defense. Carrington was convicted of simple assault, destruction of property less than $1000, and attempted possession of a prohibited weapon (attempted PPW). She was sentenced to probation and fines, with the execution of the sentence suspended.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed Carrington’s sufficiency of evidence claims de novo. The court affirmed the convictions for simple assault and destruction of property, finding sufficient evidence and no error in the trial court’s credibility determinations or rejection of self-defense. However, the appellate court reversed and vacated the conviction for attempted PPW, holding that the evidence did not establish the umbrella as a “dangerous weapon” under D.C. law in this instance, as there was insufficient proof that it was likely to produce death or great bodily injury in the manner used. View "Carrington v. United States" on Justia Law

After an argument in a third-floor apartment in northeast Washington, D.C., Clement Austin left the premises. Immediately afterward, five gunshots were detected outside the apartment by the ShotSpotter system. Marcia Austin, his aunt, called 911, identifying her nephew as the shooter and describing his appearance and vehicle. Police responded within minutes, apprehended Mr. Austin nearby, and used a key found on him to unlock a blue-green car parked near the apartment, where they recovered a loaded pistol. DNA analysis of the gun’s magazine indicated a high likelihood that Mr. Austin’s DNA was present. Five shell casings matching the gun’s caliber were found outside the apartment. Ms. Austin initially told police she saw Mr. Austin fire the gun, but at trial, she testified she did not see who fired the shots.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over the trial. The government moved to admit the 911 call as an excited utterance. After hearing arguments and Ms. Austin’s testimony about her emotional state and prior traumatic experiences with gun violence, the trial court admitted the call. The government also impeached Ms. Austin’s trial testimony with her prior statements to police. The jury convicted Mr. Austin of unlawful possession of a firearm, carrying a pistol without a license, unlawful discharge of a firearm, possession of an unregistered firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of the 911 call. The court held that ample direct and circumstantial evidence supported the convictions, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 911 call as an excited utterance. The court affirmed Mr. Austin’s convictions. View "Austin v. United States" on Justia Law

During a protest in Lafayette Square, Washington, D.C., police officers were called to remove demonstrators attempting to tear down a statue. The government alleged that Luis Rivera threw two large, T-shaped metal objects at a line of law enforcement officers, injuring two officers. Video evidence and witness testimony identified Rivera as the individual who threw the objects. Rivera was subsequently arrested and charged with multiple counts of assault on a police officer (APO), including felony and misdemeanor charges.The case was tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The jury acquitted Rivera of the more serious felony charges but found him guilty of two counts of misdemeanor APO. During trial, Rivera’s counsel sought to cross-examine several officers about disciplinary matters and potential biases, but the trial judge limited these inquiries, mostly on relevance grounds. After the jury began deliberations, it asked whether the government needed to prove Rivera intended to injure a specific officer. The trial court responded that it was sufficient for the government to show Rivera intended to harm any officer in the group.On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Rivera challenged the trial court’s response to the jury’s note and the limitations placed on his cross-examination of police witnesses. The appellate court held that any error in the trial court’s instruction regarding intent was harmless, as Rivera conceded the general accuracy of the response. The court also found that any error in limiting cross-examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, since the officers in question did not provide identification evidence and the video evidence was decisive. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed Rivera’s convictions. View "Rivera v. United States" on Justia Law

A woman was carjacked at gunpoint while filling her car at a gas station in Southeast D.C. The assailant, a stranger to her, wore a hood and brandished a gun, demanding her car keys. She focused mainly on the weapon during the brief encounter, only glancing at his face at the very end. Several hours later, police arrested Andrew Patrick driving her stolen vehicle about four miles away. Officers called the victim to the scene, where Patrick was handcuffed and positioned next to her car, flanked by police. She identified him as her assailant during two drive-by show-up procedures and later in court.The case was tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Patrick moved to suppress the victim’s identifications, arguing the show-up procedures were highly suggestive and unnecessary, given that he was already under arrest and a lineup or photo array could have been used. The trial court denied the motion, finding the procedures were not unduly suggestive and that the identifications were reliable, citing the victim’s opportunity to observe the assailant and her certainty.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether admitting the identifications violated Patrick’s due process rights. The court held that the show-up procedures were extraordinarily and unnecessarily suggestive, as Patrick was already under arrest and there was no urgency requiring a show-up. The identifications lacked independent indicia of reliability, given the victim’s limited opportunity to observe the assailant and her generic description. The court found constitutional error in admitting the identifications and reversed Patrick’s convictions for armed carjacking and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, but affirmed his other weapons-related convictions, finding those were not impacted by the identifications. View "Patrick v. United States" on Justia Law

In July 2015, Jerome Diggs was fatally shot multiple times. Before dying, Diggs identified Gary Proctor as the shooter in calls and statements to bystanders. Witnesses placed Proctor near the scene, and forensic evidence linked ammunition found in Proctor’s room to the murder weapon. Security footage showed Proctor exchanging his phone, which contained incriminating photos, the day after the murder. Investigators uncovered possible motives, including a drug debt, a dispute over drug sales, and Diggs’s anticipated testimony at a civil protection order (CPO) hearing involving Proctor’s family.The government charged Proctor with first-degree premeditated murder while armed and related firearm offenses in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The trial court made several pretrial evidentiary rulings, including admitting Diggs’s statements about Proctor’s attempt to prevent his CPO testimony under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. During trial, Proctor moved for mistrial multiple times, citing references to his prior incarceration and alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. The trial court denied these motions, issued curative instructions, and ultimately the jury convicted Proctor on all counts. At sentencing, the court took judicial notice of Proctor’s prior murder conviction, allowing a life sentence without release.On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Proctor challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of mistrial motions, evidentiary rulings, and sentencing procedures. The Court of Appeals affirmed all convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying mistrial or admitting evidence, and sentencing procedures were proper. The court declined to address ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, granting Proctor thirty days to file a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110 to develop the record on those claims. View "Proctor v. United States" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant was convicted in 2010 of several offenses, including aggravated assault while armed, after shooting an individual who was set to testify against his brother. The victim suffered serious injuries. The appellant was sentenced to a total of 336 months in prison, a sentence that was below the statutory maximum for the most serious offense. After an initial appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded for merger of certain offenses and resentencing. The trial court resentenced the appellant to the same term, and the Court of Appeals again affirmed, rejecting arguments that the sentence was improperly enhanced based on prior convictions.Subsequently, the appellant succeeded in having one of his prior convictions vacated. He then moved for resentencing in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, arguing that his sentence had been enhanced based on the now-vacated conviction and that his two remaining prior convictions should not have counted separately for enhancement purposes. The trial court granted resentencing, but determined that the two remaining convictions qualified as separate prior felonies under the relevant statute and resentenced the appellant to 240 months, again below the statutory maximum but above the advisory range in the Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court erred in applying the sentencing enhancement statute when the two prior convictions were adjudicated together. The court declined to reach the substantive statutory interpretation question, holding that because the sentence imposed was below the statutory maximum, it was not reviewable on the grounds asserted. The court reaffirmed that discretionary sentencing within statutory limits, even if based on an alleged misapplication of the Guidelines or enhancement statutes, is not subject to appellate review unless it involves materially false factual information. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

A man was convicted by a jury of several offenses related to a shooting outside a nightclub in Washington, D.C. in July 2021. The evidence showed that the defendant, who was twenty years old at the time, shot another individual and then hid the firearm. He was identified by a witness, and DNA evidence linked him to the recovered handgun. The defendant initially told police he was not the shooter, but at trial, he admitted to firing the gun, claiming self-defense.Prior to trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the defendant moved to dismiss charges related to carrying a pistol without a license, possession of an unregistered firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. He argued that the District’s laws, which require individuals to be at least twenty-one years old to obtain a firearm registration or license, violated the Second Amendment, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. The trial court denied the motion, finding the age-based restrictions consistent with the Second Amendment and historical firearm regulation. At trial, the government impeached the defendant’s credibility by highlighting inconsistencies between his initial statements and his trial testimony. The jury convicted him on all counts.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the constitutionality of the District’s age-based firearm registration and licensing statutes and the propriety of the government’s arguments regarding the defendant’s credibility. The court held that the age-based statutes are constitutional because they are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court also found that the government’s arguments about the defendant’s change in defense theory were not improper. The court affirmed the convictions but remanded for the limited purpose of merging certain convictions and resentencing as necessary. View "Picon v. United States" on Justia Law