Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case centers on an altercation between Khari Alston and his former partner, Fataya Bigesby. On July 18, 2023, outside Ms. Bigesby’s apartment building, Alston snatched her purse from her hands, followed her while demanding attention, pushed her, and eventually threw her purse and remaining contents into a busy street, resulting in the destruction of the items. Some belongings, such as keys and a wallet, were later returned, but the purse and other contents were never recovered. Surveillance footage captured portions of the incident. Ms. Bigesby testified that the event left her feeling harassed and unsafe.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia conducted a bench trial, finding Mr. Alston guilty of second-degree theft and simple assault. The court concluded that Alston had the intent to deprive Ms. Bigesby of her property either when he took her purse or, at the latest, when he threw it into the street. For assault, the court found that taking the property from her constituted an offensive touching. After Alston appealed, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded the record for clarification on the trial court’s findings regarding the timing and nature of Alston’s intent and conduct. The trial court reaffirmed its findings, specifically noting Alston’s intent to permanently deprive Ms. Bigesby of her property, and that his conduct was offensive.Upon review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the theft conviction because the statute covers wrongful use or disposition of property with intent to deprive, which was established when Alston threw the purse into traffic. For assault, the court held that nonsexual offensive touching—such as snatching a purse—constitutes assault without the need to prove intent to cause physical injury. The convictions were affirmed. View "Alston v. United States" on Justia Law

Police officers investigating a recent shooting observed an individual, Mr. Greer, walking near the scene. One officer believed Mr. Greer had a gun concealed in his waistband and, along with another officer, approached him. As Greer walked away, the officers converged on him; one blocked his path, another stood at his side, and a storefront limited his movement on the other side. The officers questioned Greer and requested that he lift his shirt. When he refused, the officers tackled and handcuffed him, ultimately discovering a firearm.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a suppression hearing before trial. The court found that Greer was only seized when physically tackled and determined that, at that moment, the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion based on the perceived outline of a firearm and supporting evidence. After denial of his motion to suppress, Greer proceeded to a stipulated trial and was convicted of multiple firearm-related offenses.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the seizure occurred earlier than the trial court found—specifically, when the officer blocked Greer’s path. The appellate court concluded that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave when surrounded and questioned by armed, uniformed officers in this manner. The court further determined that, at the moment of this initial seizure, the officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion, as their own testimony established they had not yet observed the bulge suggesting a firearm. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals therefore held that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress and reversed Greer’s convictions, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Greer v. United States" on Justia Law

A juvenile, M.W., was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his mother, which was involved in an argument with another vehicle occupied by Nira Monk, Bernard Boyd, and Monk’s children in a parking lot. During and after the argument, multiple gunshots were fired as the cars left the scene. Surveillance footage, ShotSpotter alerts, shell casings, and witness testimony indicated gunfire occurred, and bullet holes were found in Monk's vehicle. Both Monk and Boyd, who had prior convictions, testified for the prosecution. The defense argued that the gunshots originated from Monk’s car and that the bullet holes were either preexisting or fabricated for insurance fraud.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over the trial. During the proceedings, the defense attempted to introduce hearsay statements made by a third party, Arrington Archie, who was near the scene. These statements, relayed to police officers shortly after the shooting, potentially supported the defense’s theory. The trial court excluded these statements, finding insufficient evidence to treat them as admissible under the present sense impression or excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule. The trial continued, and Archie ultimately testified, but did not support the defense’s version of events.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court erred in excluding the hearsay statements. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, finding that the statements lacked sufficient evidence of spontaneity, contemporaneity, and the declarant’s state of excitement to qualify for either exception. The appellate court determined that the defense failed to meet its burden of establishing admissibility and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

Police officers discovered the appellant in possession of an unregistered semiautomatic firearm that was equipped with a magazine capable of holding thirty rounds. He was indicted for possessing a “large capacity ammunition feeding device,” possession of an unregistered firearm, carrying a pistol without a license, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The facts were largely undisputed; the firearm had a thirty-round magazine, was unregistered, and the appellant did not have a license to carry it.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia, presided over by a judge, denied the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence and his motion to dismiss, which had argued that the District’s firearm statutes violated the Second Amendment, focusing in part on the magazine capacity ban and the District’s registration and licensure schemes. The court reasoned that Supreme Court precedent, particularly New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, did not invalidate the District’s gun laws. The case proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts, and the appellant was convicted on all four counts.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The United States conceded the ban’s unconstitutionality, while the District continued to defend it. The court held that magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds are arms in common and ubiquitous use by law-abiding citizens, and there is no historical tradition of banning such arms. The court concluded that the District’s ban on these magazines violated the Second Amendment. It reversed all of the appellant’s convictions, holding that the unconstitutionality of the magazine ban also invalidated his convictions for possession of an unregistered firearm, carrying a pistol without a license, and unlawful possession of ammunition, since those charges depended on the magazine prohibition. View "Benson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2003, Tilford Johnson was murdered in Washington, D.C., and Barry Stringer and his nephew, Roderick Charles, were separately tried and convicted in 2006 of armed robbery, first-degree felony murder while armed, and related offenses. The primary evidence against Stringer included phone records, testimony from a relative, and a letter Stringer wrote to Charles while incarcerated. Both men’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, with remand only for resentencing on merged offenses. In 2014, Charles provided an affidavit confessing to acting alone in the murder, asserting Stringer’s innocence. Based on this new evidence, Stringer moved in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia under the Innocence Protection Act (IPA) for vacatur of his convictions or a new trial.The trial court held an evidentiary hearing in 2018, heard Charles’s recantation, and found him not credible, denying relief. Stringer appealed. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated and remanded, finding the trial court’s credibility assessment of Charles inadequately supported and directing reconsideration, especially regarding inconsistencies between Charles’s testimony, physical evidence, and a letter from Stringer. On remand, the trial court again found Charles not credible, primarily citing blood evidence at the crime scene and Stringer’s letter as inconsistent with Charles’s account. The court also briefly mentioned Charles’s demeanor as unconvincing but placed little weight on it.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found clear errors in the trial court’s factual analysis. The appellate court held that the trial court’s findings about the blood evidence and the significance of the letter rested on unsupported speculation and factual mistakes. The court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for further consideration, requiring a more thorough and evidence-based review consistent with its opinion. View "Stringer v. United States" on Justia Law

A man was arrested after a violent assault in which the victim suffered multiple stab wounds but survived. The victim gave several accounts of the events to police, at first describing a drug deal gone wrong and later, at trial, attributing the attack to a robbery related to gambling winnings. In each account, the victim identified the accused as being present and involved in the incident, sometimes as the sole attacker and sometimes as someone who pushed the victim into a car with other individuals. Police interviewed witnesses, confirmed the accused lived at a relevant address, and seized his cell phone after his arrest.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the accused’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his cell phone. The trial court found that there was probable cause to believe the phone contained evidence related to the crime, that the warrant was not overbroad, and, in the alternative, that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. After trial, a jury convicted the accused of assault with intent to kill and aggravated assault, but acquitted him on kidnapping and robbery charges. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found the search warrant for the cell phone constitutionally deficient. The court held that the warrant lacked probable cause and particularity, as required by the Fourth Amendment, because the supporting affidavit failed to establish any nexus between the phone and the crime or to specify what evidence was sought. The court further held that the good-faith exception did not apply, as the warrant was a bare-bones, general warrant. The court reversed the denial of suppression, vacated the convictions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gibbs v. United States" on Justia Law

Police officers discovered a semiautomatic firearm equipped with a 30-round magazine in the possession of Tyree Benson. The firearm was unregistered, contained ammunition, and Benson did not have a license to carry it. He was charged with possession of a large capacity ammunition feeding device (a magazine holding more than ten rounds), possession of an unregistered firearm, carrying a pistol without a license, and unlawful possession of ammunition. Before trial, Benson moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds and to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, arguing that the District of Columbia’s ban on magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds violated the Second Amendment, as did the District’s registration and licensure schemes. The trial court, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, denied both motions, reasoning that Supreme Court precedent in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen did not invalidate D.C.’s gun laws. Following a bench trial on stipulated facts, Benson was convicted on all counts.On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Benson renewed his constitutional arguments. The United States, which had prosecuted Benson, ultimately agreed with him that the magazine ban was unconstitutional. However, the District of Columbia, as intervenor-appellee, continued to defend the ban.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds are “arms” under the Second Amendment, that such magazines are in common and ubiquitous use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, and that there is no historical tradition of banning arms in such common use. Accordingly, the court held that the District’s outright ban on 11+ round magazines violates the Second Amendment. Because the magazine ban rendered it impossible for Benson to register, license, or lawfully possess ammunition for his firearm, the court reversed all of his convictions. The court thus vacated Benson’s convictions and did not reach his other constitutional claims. View "Benson v. United States" on Justia Law

A marijuana dealer was shot and killed in the stairwell of his apartment building while making a sale. The government asserted that the defendant, although not the shooter, was guilty of felony murder because the killing occurred during a robbery he planned with the admitted shooter. Critical government witnesses included the shooter, who testified pursuant to a plea deal, and a mutual acquaintance who received immunity; both placed the defendant at the scene and as a participant in the robbery. However, no physical evidence connected the defendant to the crime scene, and a disinterested eyewitness testified that the defendant was not among the fleeing assailants.The defendant was convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia of first-degree felony murder while armed and related offenses after a jury trial. He subsequently filed a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. At the post-conviction hearing, the trial court found the government’s case strong, credited much of trial counsel’s testimony about trial preparation, and denied the motion.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of the § 23-110 motion. The appellate court found that trial counsel’s representation was constitutionally deficient in several respects, including misunderstanding the elements of felony murder, failing to adequately prepare the defendant to testify, and adopting a trial strategy that exposed the defendant to prejudicial information about his criminal history. The appellate court determined that these deficiencies created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the verdict would have been different. The court therefore reversed the Superior Court’s denial of the defendant’s motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Truesdale v. United States" on Justia Law

The case arose from an altercation between the appellant and a bicyclist in Washington, D.C. The bicyclist, seeing the appellant in apparent distress, approached to offer assistance. The appellant reacted aggressively, leading to a struggle over the bicycle. During the confrontation, the appellant stabbed the bicyclist with a knife, causing significant injury. Eyewitnesses and video evidence captured portions of the incident, and the appellant was arrested at the scene. At trial, the appellant testified about his mental health issues and claimed he acted in self-defense, while evidence was presented regarding his erratic behavior and mental state at the time of the incident.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia conducted a bench trial in which the appellant represented himself with standby counsel. The trial court found the government had disproven self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, based in significant part on the credibility of an eyewitness and video evidence. The court convicted the appellant of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault causing significant bodily injury, and imposed a sentence of imprisonment followed by supervised release.On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding self-defense and argued that the trial court erred by not conducting a Frendak inquiry to determine whether he intelligently and voluntarily waived an insanity defense. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the trial court’s findings on that issue. However, the appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a Frendak inquiry, given the evidence of the appellant’s mental illness and statements at trial. The case was remanded for the trial court to conduct the required inquiry and take further action as appropriate based on its findings. View "Campbell v. United States" on Justia Law

Police officers stopped an individual driving a car in the District of Columbia, citing two reasons: failure to use a turn signal when making a turn and the presence of tint on the car’s front windshield. During the stop, an officer saw a handgun in the glove box, leading to a search that uncovered both the handgun and PCP. The officer testified that any tint on a front windshield is illegal, but did not measure the level of tint or issue a notice of infraction for either violation.After being charged, the individual moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the stop lacked a lawful basis because D.C. law allows some level of front-windshield tint, and there was no corroboration of the alleged turn signal violation. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the motion to suppress, finding that the officer had probable cause to believe a tint violation occurred, even though the officer was mistaken about the law. The court did not rely on the alleged failure to signal, finding it questionable.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the government failed to show the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion that the windshield tint was illegal, since the law permitted some tint and there was no evidence the tint actually exceeded legal limits. The officer’s misunderstanding of the law was not objectively reasonable. The court also found no basis to remand for reconsideration of the turn signal issue, as the government did not present sufficient evidence at the suppression hearing. As a result, the appellate court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Griffin v. United States" on Justia Law