Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a woman sold drugs to an undercover officer and left in a car driven by the defendant, police arrested the defendant and recovered nearly $700—including prerecorded bills from the drug purchase—and a bag containing thirty-three grams of a white, powder-like substance from his person. Police also found a firearm, a scale, and additional currency in the car. The defendant was indicted on multiple drug and gun charges, including possession with intent to distribute (PWID) cocaine while armed and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (FIP). Before trial, the government dismissed several charges, dropped the while armed enhancement, and elected to proceed on attempted PWID cocaine as a lesser included offense. The defense did not object to these changes.During trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, two officers testified that the bag contained a substance consistent with cocaine, but the court sustained defense objections to testimony that the substance was definitively cocaine, as no testing evidence was presented. After the government stated it was resting its case, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient proof regarding both the controlled substance and the firearm charge. The trial court permitted the government to reopen its case to admit a stipulation—previously agreed to by the parties—that the defendant had a prior felony conviction and knew of it, curing a deficiency on the FIP charge. The court denied the acquittal motion, finding the evidence sufficient.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to reopen its case to admit the stipulation. The appellate court affirmed the FIP conviction. Regarding the attempted PWID charge, the court concluded that, because the jury convicted the defendant of attempted PWID of an unspecified controlled substance (rather than cocaine specifically), the felony conviction and sentence for attempted PWID cocaine was improper. The appellate court vacated the felony conviction and remanded for entry of a misdemeanor conviction and resentencing. View "Pritchett v United States" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant and her son were charged in connection with an assault and shooting that took place in the stairwell of an apartment building in Southeast Washington, D.C. The incident followed a dispute earlier in the evening between the appellant and the victim, Shawn Watts. After being told to leave the apartment, the appellant returned with her son, who was armed. Together, they assaulted Mr. Watts, with the son ultimately shooting him in the leg. The appellant was tried separately from her son and faced several charges, including conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon, aggravated assault while armed, and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (PFCV).The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over the jury trial. The jury convicted the appellant of conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon, aggravated assault while armed (including a “while armed” sentencing enhancement), and PFCV, but acquitted her on other counts. She was sentenced to seventy-two months of imprisonment, followed by supervised release. On appeal, she challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the PFCV conviction and the “while armed” enhancement, and she also raised issues regarding the trial court’s handling of witness testimony and jury instructions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the appellant’s conviction for PFCV under an aiding-and-abetting theory, as there was no evidence that the victim posed a threat of disarming the gunman, or that the appellant’s actions were undertaken with the requisite guilty knowledge. However, the court found sufficient evidence for the “while armed” enhancement to the aggravated assault conviction, as the appellant knew about the gun and continued to participate in the assault. The court affirmed the convictions for conspiracy and aggravated assault with the enhancement, but reversed the PFCV conviction. View "Chandler v. United States" on Justia Law

A Black man was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of attempted robbery after allegedly assaulting a white woman. During jury selection, the government used its peremptory strikes to remove all six nonwhite prospective jurors—four Black, one Asian, and one Hispanic—from a venire of thirty-six, resulting in an all-white jury. The defense objected, arguing that the prosecutor’s actions were racially discriminatory and violated the precedent established in Batson v. Kentucky. The government provided purportedly race-neutral reasons for the strikes of the Black jurors, such as concerns about their ability to understand scientific testimony or responses during voir dire. The trial court accepted these explanations, found them credible and race-neutral, and denied the Batson challenge.A jury in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia acquitted the defendant of attempted robbery but convicted him on both sexual abuse counts. On appeal, a division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the trial court had adequately scrutinized the government’s justifications for the jury strikes. The defendant sought en banc review, and the division’s decision was vacated pending review by the full District of Columbia Court of Appeals.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that the trial court’s Batson analysis was insufficient because it failed to rigorously scrutinize the prosecutor’s explanations in the context of the entire record, including statistical evidence and the racially charged nature of the case. The court found that at least one of the government’s strikes was more likely than not racially discriminatory. Accordingly, it reversed the defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

The appellant committed a series of violent crimes in 1982, including first-degree murder, rape, and armed robbery, when he was eighteen years old. He entered into a global plea agreement, receiving a sixty-five years to life sentence. During his forty-three years of incarceration, he took part in a wide range of educational and rehabilitative programs, maintained employment, and generally avoided violent infractions, with only one such infraction in 1999. However, he did receive a disciplinary infraction for “stalking” female prison staff in 2016, which was characterized by repeated grievances and derogatory language rather than physical or sexual misconduct. He was not referred to, nor did he complete, sex offender treatment, though a psychological expert opined this was not necessary for his rehabilitation.After serving the minimum time required, the appellant filed a motion in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking sentence reduction under the Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act (IRAA). At the evidentiary hearing, he presented evidence of his rehabilitation and low risk of recidivism, including a favorable PATTERN score and a psychologist’s report. The trial court denied the motion, finding he failed to prove he was no longer dangerous, placing significant weight on his lack of sex offender treatment and the 2016 infraction, and referencing factors such as the seriousness of his original offenses and deterrence.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded the case. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an unsupported assumption that the appellant needed sex offender treatment to demonstrate non-dangerousness, despite expert evidence to the contrary. The appellate court also found error in the trial court’s interests of justice analysis by relying on factors outside those enumerated in the IRAA, including seriousness of the offense. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate opinion. View "Davidson v. United States" on Justia Law

Police officers encountered a man at a playground in a public park while he was with his daughter and partner. The officers were conducting a patrol and had observed a group they suspected of smoking marijuana. The man had walked away from the group to rejoin his family. Five armed, uniformed officers approached and encircled him, with two officers standing within arm's reach and three others positioned nearby. One officer asked if the man had a firearm, and he admitted that he did; officers then frisked him and recovered a gun from his waistband.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a hearing on a motion to suppress the firearm. The trial court found that the defendant was not seized until after he admitted to possessing a firearm and officers physically restrained him. The court emphasized the officers’ cordial tone, the brief nature of the encounter, and the public setting, and denied the motion to suppress. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted the defendant of unlawful possession of a firearm, carrying a pistol without a license, and possession of an unregistered firearm.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes before he admitted to possessing a firearm—specifically, when five officers encircled and focused exclusively on him, blocking his exits and asking accusatory questions. The court concluded that this seizure was unsupported by reasonable articulable suspicion and thus unlawful. It reversed all convictions, holding that the firearm should have been suppressed as the fruit of the unlawful seizure, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ervin v. United States" on Justia Law

On the night of September 15, 2016, an altercation occurred in Southeast Washington, D.C., during which Andre Becton shot Darnell Peoples in the leg and neck, resulting in Peoples’s death. The incident followed a verbal exchange and physical struggle between the two men, witnessed by Debra Moore. Mr. Becton fled the scene. Police later identified him as the shooter based on eyewitness accounts and a dying declaration by Peoples. Mr. Becton was arrested after police seized his vehicle and, during an interview, he denied involvement despite being informed of the possibility of a self-defense claim. Investigators obtained and searched Mr. Becton’s iPhone after securing a warrant, recovering text messages and other data.Prior to trial, Mr. Becton’s counsel did not move to suppress the cell phone evidence. At trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the court excluded evidence of Peoples’s prior domestic violence allegations, finding them more prejudicial than probative under the factors outlined in Shepherd v. United States. The jury convicted Mr. Becton of second-degree murder while acquitting him of first-degree murder. While his direct appeal was pending, Mr. Becton filed a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move to suppress the cell phone evidence. The trial court found counsel’s performance deficient but concluded there was no prejudice because the cell phone evidence was not central to the government’s case.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed both the conviction and the denial of the Section 23-110 motion. The court held that the exclusion of the prior domestic violence evidence was not an abuse of discretion, as the trial court properly balanced its probative value and prejudicial effect. The court also held that Mr. Becton failed to show prejudice from counsel’s performance because the outcome would not likely have changed without the cell phone evidence. Accordingly, the convictions and denial of post-conviction relief were affirmed. View "Becton v. United States" on Justia Law

Late one night in January 2019, three men—Sean Shuler, Javon Abney, and Tyrik Hagood—were shot and killed on a street in Southeast Washington, D.C. Rakeem Willis and Jonathan Winston were charged with three counts of first-degree (premeditated) murder in connection with these deaths. Evidence at trial included eyewitness accounts, forensic findings, and extensive cell phone records, including historical cell site location information (CSLI) used to trace phone movements. The government presented FBI Special Agent Billy Shaw as an expert to interpret the CSLI data, linking Willis’s phones to the vicinity of the crime and subsequent locations.Prior to trial, Winston moved to exclude the CSLI expert’s report and testimony, arguing the government’s notice was insufficient under Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and that the methodology lacked reliability as required by Motorola Inc. v. Murray and Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The motions court admitted the expert testimony over objections, relying on prior experience and cross-examination as safeguards, and declined to hold a Daubert hearing. The trial court later granted Winston’s motion for judgment of acquittal, but Willis was convicted by a jury of all three murder counts and sentenced to 120 years in prison.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that the motions court failed to properly exercise its gatekeeping role under Rule 702 and Motorola by not sufficiently evaluating whether the expert had reliably applied CSLI methodology to the facts. The appellate court held this error was not harmless, given the centrality of the expert testimony to the government’s case. It therefore reversed Willis’s first-degree murder convictions and remanded for further proceedings. View "Willis v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2001, Joseph Jackson, then twenty years old, was involved in a drug-related conflict in southeast Washington, D.C. After being told by a rival dealer, Larry Smith, that he could no longer sell drugs in the area, Jackson instructed his associate, Troy Ashley, to “handle that.” Ashley, with the help of Jason Parker, confronted Smith and his associates, resulting in Ashley shooting and killing Smith and robbing and shooting the other two men. Ashley and Parker reported back to Jackson, who expressed excitement and rewarded Parker with drugs. Jackson was subsequently convicted by a jury in 2003 of first-degree premeditated murder, armed robbery, and other offenses.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals previously affirmed Jackson’s convictions and remanded for merger of offenses and resentencing, after which Jackson received a thirty-five-year prison term. In 2023, Jackson moved in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for a sentence reduction under the Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act (IRAA), arguing that he had matured and was no longer dangerous. The government opposed, citing Jackson’s extensive record of violent and nonviolent disciplinary infractions during incarceration, including assaults and possession of contraband. The Superior Court found Jackson met the threshold for IRAA consideration but, after reviewing the statutory factors, determined that his continued infractions and lack of rehabilitation weighed against sentence reduction. The court denied the motion, finding Jackson remained a danger and that the interests of justice did not warrant modification.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that the Superior Court properly considered the relevant IRAA factors, including Jackson’s personal circumstances and role in the offense, and found no error in its analysis. The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying Jackson’s motion for sentence reduction. View "Jackson v. United States" on Justia Law

In October 2022, a man crashed his car into a parked vehicle in southeast Washington, D.C. After the collision, the car’s owner confronted him, and as police arrived, the man fled on foot. Officers pursued and apprehended him, discovering a gun with a large-capacity magazine under a vehicle along his escape route and another large-capacity magazine with ammunition inside his car. He was charged with several firearm-related offenses, including possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device and unlawful possession of ammunition.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss the large-capacity magazine charges on Second Amendment grounds and to suppress the evidence found at the scene, ruling that the search and seizure were justified. After a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition, both based on the magazine found in his car. He was acquitted of other charges. The defendant appealed, challenging the denial of suppression, the sufficiency of the evidence for the large-capacity magazine conviction, the lack of a jury instruction on knowledge, and the constitutionality of the statute.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. After oral argument, the government moved to vacate the large-capacity magazine conviction due to a change in its position on the statute’s constitutionality, which the court granted. The court affirmed the denial of suppression and upheld the unlawful possession of ammunition conviction, holding that the officers’ entry into the car to seize the magazine was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as they had probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of criminal activity. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Miller v. United States" on Justia Law

Steven Robin was observed by police at an apartment complex parking lot, where officers saw him grab his waistband and duck behind a parked car. Officers believed he had deposited a firearm under the vehicle, and subsequent surveillance and body camera footage supported this account. Robin was arrested, and a firearm was recovered from under the car. DNA testing showed Robin’s DNA on the firearm but not on the magazine. At trial, Robin argued that someone else had placed the firearm there or that officers had planted it, and he presented evidence suggesting improper police handling of the firearm.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over Robin’s trial. The judge instructed the jury that all exhibits except the firearm and ammunition would be available during deliberations, and that the firearm and ammunition could be examined only upon request, with a U.S. Marshal present for security. During deliberations, the jury requested to see the firearm, and the marshal brought it to the jury room. A juror asked if the magazine could be inserted into the gun, and the marshal either did so or allowed a juror to do so, but did not allow ammunition to be loaded. The jury conducted a demonstration with the firearm and found Robin guilty on all charges. After learning of these events, Robin moved for a new trial, arguing that the marshal’s interaction constituted impermissible ex parte communication and violated his constitutional rights. The trial judge denied the motion, finding the marshal’s actions ministerial and consistent with jury instructions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Robin forfeited his claims by failing to object to the jury instructions regarding the marshal’s role. The court found no plain error in the marshal’s conduct, concluding that the marshal’s actions were ministerial and did not require judicial oversight or party input. The court affirmed Robin’s convictions. View "Robin v. United States" on Justia Law