Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two men were tried together for a shooting that resulted in the death of one person and injuries to two others. The evidence against them included surveillance videos, cell phone and social media records, DNA evidence, and expert testimony. The key factual dispute at trial was whether the two defendants were the men captured on video committing the shooting, as the government alleged. The prosecution also presented testimony from a firearms examiner who stated that there was “extremely strong support” that shell casings found at the scene were fired from a rifle recovered near the defendants’ crashed vehicle. One defendant was also linked to a distinctive blue puffer jacket seen on the shooter in surveillance footage.In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, both defendants were convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to kill, and multiple firearm offenses. The trial judge permitted the firearms examiner’s testimony over defense objections, concluding it was consistent with existing law so long as the expert did not claim absolute certainty. The trial judge also limited defense counsel’s closing argument about the prevalence of blue puffer jackets, sustaining an objection to a portion of that argument.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals assumed for argument’s sake that it was error to allow the firearms expert’s testimony and agreed that restricting the defense’s closing argument about the jacket was an abuse of discretion. However, the court held that any errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including video, DNA, and witness identification. The court ordered that certain firearm convictions merge, leaving each defendant with one conviction for possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and vacated one defendant’s conviction for carrying a rifle or shotgun outside the home, finding the statutory prohibition unconstitutional. All other convictions were affirmed. View "Stevenson v. United States" on Justia Law

Late at night in January 2019, three men were shot and killed on a street in Southeast Washington, D.C. The appellant, along with a co-defendant, was charged with three counts of first-degree (premeditated) murder for the deaths of these men. The government’s evidence at trial included eyewitness accounts, evidence of a burned vehicle allegedly used in the shooting, call records linking the appellant to one of the victims, and expert testimony based on historical cell site location information (CSLI) to track the appellant’s movements. Additionally, the appellant was charged with fleeing a law enforcement officer after leading police on a high-speed chase when they attempted to arrest him.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over the pretrial and trial proceedings. The motions court admitted the government’s CSLI expert testimony over the co-defendant’s objection, declined to hold a Daubert hearing, and relied on cross-examination to address reliability concerns. After trial, the appellant was convicted on all counts, while the co-defendant was acquitted at the close of the government’s case. The appellant was sentenced to consecutive terms for the murder convictions and a concurrent sentence for fleeing.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the motions court did not properly fulfill its gatekeeping function under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Motorola Inc. v. Murray, failing to assess whether the expert reliably applied cell site analysis methods to the case’s facts. The court found this error was not harmless due to the centrality of the expert’s testimony. The court reversed the murder convictions and remanded for further proceedings, including a possible new trial, but affirmed the flight conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in the handling of a sleeping juror issue related to that charge. View "Willis v. United States" on Justia Law

Two Metropolitan Police Department investigators, while patrolling in an unmarked car, approached a parked vehicle with its headlights on and observed Brian K. Williams in the driver’s seat. As officers engaged Williams in conversation, one investigator noticed a thin, rectangular object on Williams’s right groin area, which the officer believed, based on his training and experience, resembled the receiver or slide of a firearm rather than a cell phone or part of Williams’s anatomy. Williams denied having contraband and, when the investigator indicated an intent to frisk him, Williams fled but was quickly apprehended. Officers found a firearm in his pants and arrested him.Williams was charged in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia with several firearm-related offenses, including unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, carrying a pistol without a license, possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device, possession of an unregistered firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. Before trial, Williams moved to suppress the evidence found during his arrest, arguing that officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the seizure. After a suppression hearing, the Superior Court denied his motion, crediting the investigator’s testimony and finding reasonable articulable suspicion based on the observed object, Williams’s movements, and recent shootings in the area. A stipulated trial resulted in convictions on all charges.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to seize Williams, relying on the totality of the circumstances, including the specific characteristics of the object, Williams’s conduct, and recent violent crime in the area. The Court affirmed the convictions for all charges except possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device, which was vacated upon an unopposed government motion due to the statute’s unconstitutionality. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1980, the appellant was convicted by a jury of oral sodomy under a District of Columbia statute that, at the time, criminalized all acts of sodomy regardless of consent. The incident involved C.P., a co-defendant, and a complaining witness who testified that she was forced to engage in sexual acts after accepting a ride from the defendants. The appellant claimed the acts were consensual. The trial court instructed the jury that consent was not a defense to sodomy under the law then in effect. C.P. was sentenced to incarceration and, after later enactments, required to register as a sex offender for life.After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 1981, C.P. filed several post-conviction motions. In 2004, he sought to vacate his conviction, arguing that subsequent legislative changes and the repeal of the sodomy statute rendered his conduct non-criminal. The Superior Court denied this motion, finding no retroactive effect for the legal changes. In 2018, C.P. challenged his lifetime sex offender registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), arguing that the registration requirement was invalid without a jury finding of force. In 2021, he moved to vacate his conviction again, this time arguing that his conviction and resulting registration violated substantive due process under Lawrence v. Texas. The Superior Court denied both motions, holding the latter was procedurally barred as a successive writ and that C.P. had not shown exceptional circumstances to excuse the default.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the denials of the 2018 and 2021 motions. It held that the motion to vacate was properly denied as an abuse of the writ, and that the challenge to SORA registration failed because the trial court had sufficient evidence to find forcible sodomy by a preponderance of the evidence. The court affirmed both denials. View "C.P. v. United States" on Justia Law

On a December evening, a Metropolitan Police Department officer responded to reports of disorderly groups in Southeast Washington, D.C., an area associated with frequent gun-related incidents. The officer observed four men walking and overheard a comment he interpreted as referring to gun violence. He monitored the group and began interacting with them, including Allen Grant, who voluntarily stated he had no guns. Grant carried a satchel, which he moved behind his back when questioned, prompting repeated requests from the officer to see it. Grant denied having anything in the satchel, continued walking, and ultimately threw the satchel over a fence. Another officer found a gun inside the satchel, after which Grant fled and was arrested approximately thirty minutes later.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over the suppression hearing on Grant's motion to exclude evidence from the satchel, arguing an unlawful seizure. The trial court found that Grant had not been seized before discarding the satchel, as he continued walking and ultimately ran, and there was no show of force by officers. The trial court characterized the interaction as an investigatory conversation and denied the motion to suppress. Grant was subsequently convicted by a jury on several firearm-related charges and sentenced to imprisonment and supervised release.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion. The Court held that Grant was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment prior to discarding the satchel, as he did not submit to the officer’s show of authority. The evidence found in the satchel was not the fruit of an illegal seizure. The Court applied a de novo review to legal issues and deferred to factual findings unless clearly erroneous. The order denying suppression was affirmed. View "Grant v. United States" on Justia Law

A violent series of confrontations between residents of two Southeast D.C. neighborhoods resulted in several shootings, including two murders and multiple assaults, during 2016 and 2017. One defendant, a resident of Wahler Place, was implicated in these violent acts and was connected to the crimes through witness identifications, forensic ballistics, cell phone location data, and his possession of the firearm used in the shootings. The second defendant, an employee of the Metropolitan Police Department and longtime acquaintance of the first defendant, used her access to police databases to search for information related to the shootings and communicated with the first defendant after each incident.Following an investigation, both individuals were indicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and faced numerous charges. The first defendant moved to suppress evidence based on alleged Fourth Amendment violations related to the seizure and search of his vehicle and cell phones, but the trial court denied these motions. After an eleven-week jury trial, the first defendant was convicted of multiple counts, including murder, assault with intent to kill, firearm offenses, and obstruction of justice. The second defendant was acquitted of the most serious charges but convicted of being an accessory after the fact (AAF) and obstruction of justice. Both appealed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the first defendant’s convictions for murder, assault, and related firearm offenses, concluding that the evidence was sufficient and that the searches satisfied Fourth Amendment exceptions or were admissible under the good-faith exception. However, the court reversed the second defendant’s AAF convictions, holding that the government failed to prove she had actual knowledge of the principal’s crimes when she provided assistance. The court also vacated all obstruction of justice convictions for both defendants, finding the statute did not apply to the proceedings at issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Jennings & Turner v. United States" on Justia Law

Three individuals, including the appellant, planned to rob a man they believed to be a drug dealer. The appellant drove the group to the meeting site and remained in the car while one co-defendant ultimately shot and killed the victim during the attempted robbery. All three were arrested and charged. One co-defendant cooperated with the government and received probation, while the appellant and the shooter proceeded to trial. The jury found the appellant guilty of first-degree (felony) murder while armed, attempted robbery while armed, and conspiracy. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia sentenced the appellant to an aggregate term of thirty years, with the sentences for conspiracy and attempted robbery running concurrently with the mandatory minimum for the murder conviction.The appellant appealed, arguing that being sentenced for both first-degree (felony) murder and the underlying felony violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing to address the merger issue. On remand, the Superior Court considered whether it had discretion to vacate either the felony murder conviction or the underlying felony. The court indicated a preference for vacating the murder conviction due to the appellant’s lesser culpability but concluded, based on District of Columbia Court of Appeals precedent, that it was required to vacate the lesser underlying felony and retain the felony murder conviction.Upon renewed appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that, when a defendant is convicted of both first-degree (felony) murder and the predicate felony, the trial court does not have discretion to choose which conviction to vacate. Instead, it must vacate the underlying felony and retain the felony murder conviction, unless legislative intent indicates otherwise. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "Hewitt v. United States" on Justia Law

The appellant pled guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon and assault with intent to kill while armed, pursuant to a plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) which specified a twelve-year sentence. Before sentencing, the appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that one of his attorneys had incorrectly advised him that the judge could reduce the agreed-upon sentence to eight years. Testimony at the motion hearing established that this inaccurate advice was provided, and the trial court credited the attorney who testified to the miscommunication.Following the guilty plea, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia considered the motion to withdraw. The trial court found that although the appellant did not have competent counsel at all times, he failed to show that he would not have taken the plea but for the incorrect advice. The trial court applied the Strickland v. Washington standard, requiring a reasonable probability that the attorney’s deficient performance caused the plea, and denied the motion to withdraw.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court clarified that, under the standard for presentence withdrawal of guilty pleas, a defendant need not show strict Strickland prejudice, especially when the request is made before sentencing. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by requiring such a showing and by not properly weighing the competency of counsel with other relevant factors such as promptness of withdrawal and assertion of legal innocence. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case for reconsideration, instructing the trial court to reassess whether justice demands the withdrawal of the guilty plea based on the correct legal standard. View "Jackson v. United States" on Justia Law

An individual was convicted following a bench trial for unlawful entry after refusing to leave a convenience store when asked to do so by a Metropolitan Police Department officer at the request of a store clerk. The arrest occurred shortly after the discovery of a deceased person in the store’s back room, which led to the defendant expressing frustration that the store had not been closed to customers. The responding officer testified at trial, recounting that the store clerk asked for assistance in removing the defendant, and body-worn camera footage corroborated the clerk’s request and the officer’s repeated instructions for the defendant to leave.The case was originally tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The defense moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government failed to prove that a person with authority asked the defendant to leave, that it relied on inadmissible hearsay, and that the defendant did not refuse to leave the premises. The trial court credited the testimony of the police officer and found the defendant guilty of unlawful entry.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the conviction. The appellant argued that the clerk’s statement was inadmissible hearsay, that the government failed to show lawful authority to request his removal, and that there was insufficient evidence of refusal to leave. The Court of Appeals held that the clerk’s statement was properly admitted as nonhearsay because it was introduced to show its effect on the officer and to explain the officer's actions, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The court also found sufficient evidence that the clerk had lawful authority over the premises and that the defendant refused to leave after being repeatedly instructed. The conviction was affirmed. View "Hinton v. United States" on Justia Law

After a woman sold drugs to an undercover officer and left in a car driven by the defendant, police arrested the defendant and recovered nearly $700—including prerecorded bills from the drug purchase—and a bag containing thirty-three grams of a white, powder-like substance from his person. Police also found a firearm, a scale, and additional currency in the car. The defendant was indicted on multiple drug and gun charges, including possession with intent to distribute (PWID) cocaine while armed and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (FIP). Before trial, the government dismissed several charges, dropped the while armed enhancement, and elected to proceed on attempted PWID cocaine as a lesser included offense. The defense did not object to these changes.During trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, two officers testified that the bag contained a substance consistent with cocaine, but the court sustained defense objections to testimony that the substance was definitively cocaine, as no testing evidence was presented. After the government stated it was resting its case, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient proof regarding both the controlled substance and the firearm charge. The trial court permitted the government to reopen its case to admit a stipulation—previously agreed to by the parties—that the defendant had a prior felony conviction and knew of it, curing a deficiency on the FIP charge. The court denied the acquittal motion, finding the evidence sufficient.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to reopen its case to admit the stipulation. The appellate court affirmed the FIP conviction. Regarding the attempted PWID charge, the court concluded that, because the jury convicted the defendant of attempted PWID of an unspecified controlled substance (rather than cocaine specifically), the felony conviction and sentence for attempted PWID cocaine was improper. The appellate court vacated the felony conviction and remanded for entry of a misdemeanor conviction and resentencing. View "Pritchett v United States" on Justia Law