Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involves a challenge to the District of Columbia Public Service Commission’s approval of Potomac Electric Power Company’s (Pepco) 2024–2026 multi-year electric rate plan. The petitioners, the Office of the People’s Counsel and the Apartment and Office Building Association, objected to the Commission’s decision to approve a $123.4 million rate increase following a “legislative-style” hearing that did not permit the presentation or cross-examination of witnesses. The petitioners argued that the process failed to address significant factual disputes, particularly concerning the Effective Rate Adjustment (ERA) and Bill Stabilization Adjustment (BSA), mechanisms affecting rates for large commercial customers. They maintained that an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve these factual disagreements.The Public Service Commission, after receiving written testimony and briefs, denied requests for an evidentiary hearing and approved Pepco’s rate plan with modifications. It concluded that there were no material factual disputes necessitating cross-examination or oral testimony, and thus a legislative-style hearing was sufficient. The Commission also rejected applications for reconsideration, reiterating its view that the contested issues were either legal or policy-based rather than factual. However, there were substantial discrepancies between the parties’ calculations regarding the BSA deferral balances and concerns about the ERA’s impact on certain customer classes.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that this proceeding was a “contested case” under the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act and that the Commission was required to hold an evidentiary, trial-type hearing because there were genuine disputes over material facts. The court held that the Commission’s failure to provide such a hearing rendered its orders unsustainable. Accordingly, the court vacated the Commission’s orders and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Commission to hold an evidentiary hearing. View "Office of the People's Counsel v. District of Columbia Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

The case concerns the termination of the General Counsel of the District of Columbia Retirement Board (DCRB), who had served in that role for nearly fourteen years. Following an internal investigation in 2021–2022, DCRB found that the General Counsel had failed to properly investigate and disclose conflict-of-interest allegations about a prior Executive Director. Based on these findings, DCRB initiated removal proceedings, ultimately deciding to terminate the General Counsel. The termination notice advised her of her right to appeal to the Office of Employee Appeals (OEA), where she argued, among other things, that her removal violated a regulatory “ninety-day rule.”Before OEA, the General Counsel claimed that she was a Career Service employee, which would entitle her to removal protections and OEA review. DCRB did not contest this characterization before OEA. OEA found in her favor and ordered her reinstatement, concluding that DCRB had violated the ninety-day rule. DCRB then petitioned the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for review, newly contending that the General Counsel was not in the Career Service but instead was a Senior Executive Attorney in the Legal Service—a category of at-will employees not entitled to OEA review or removal protections. The Superior Court found factual disputes regarding her employment status and remanded the case to OEA to determine its jurisdiction.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the statutory provisions governing DCRB and the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act unambiguously classified the General Counsel as a Senior Executive Attorney in the Legal Service, making her an at-will employee not entitled to OEA review. The court concluded that the Superior Court committed clear error by remanding for factual findings on this question. Accordingly, it reversed the Superior Court’s order and directed that Ms. Sampson’s OEA appeal be dismissed. View "District of Columbia Retirement Board v. Office of Employee Appeals" on Justia Law

A police officer employed by the Metropolitan Police Department experienced a data breach that exposed sensitive information of numerous employees. In response, the officer filed a putative class action in Superior Court for the District of Columbia, naming the District, certain government entities, and several private technology contractors as defendants. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to safeguard employees’ data.During the proceedings, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed certain contractor defendants without prejudice, leaving the government defendants and a few contractors. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted the District’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the Metropolitan Police Department and the Office of the Chief Technology Officer could not be sued as unincorporated government bodies, and that sovereign immunity barred the claims against the District. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Subsequently, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed without prejudice the remaining private contractor defendants and asked the Superior Court to close the case. The Superior Court closed the case, prompting the plaintiff to appeal both the dismissal of her claims against the District and the denial of reconsideration.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that because the plaintiff dismissed her claims against the final contractor defendants without prejudice, the trial court’s order was not final as to all parties and claims. The court explained that dismissals without prejudice do not resolve the merits and thus do not confer appellate jurisdiction, except in rare circumstances. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the order below was not a final, appealable order. View "Moore v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Several individuals challenged the validity of the District of Columbia’s Anti-SLAPP Act, which provides defendants in certain lawsuits—those deemed “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPPs)—with a special motion to dismiss and limits discovery in those cases. The challengers argued that the D.C. Council exceeded its authority under the Home Rule Act by enacting the Anti-SLAPP Act, claiming that its discovery-limiting provisions impermissibly intruded on the procedural rules governing the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, which are set by Title 11 of the D.C. Code.A division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals previously agreed with the challengers, holding that the Anti-SLAPP Act’s discovery provisions violated the Home Rule Act by interfering with Title 11’s mandate that the Superior Court follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except as modified by the courts themselves. The division’s decision was subsequently vacated when the full court granted en banc review.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the division’s decision. The court held that the D.C. Council did not exceed its authority under the Home Rule Act by passing the Anti-SLAPP Act. The court reasoned that the Act does not amend Title 11, does not alter the organization or jurisdiction of the District’s courts, does not divest the courts of their rulemaking authority, and does not fundamentally change the court system. Instead, the Act supplements procedures for a limited subset of cases in a manner consistent with Title 11. The court concluded that the Council’s broad legislative authority includes the power to enact such laws, and that the Anti-SLAPP Act does not violate the Home Rule Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Banks v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

Yazam, Inc., operating as Empower, is a private vehicle-for-hire company that provides a digital app connecting drivers with passengers. Unlike other rideshare platforms, Empower sells monthly subscriptions to drivers, who then set their own fares and retain the full payment from riders. The District of Columbia Department of For-Hire Vehicles (DFHV) ordered Empower to cease operations in the District for failing to register as required by law. Empower requested an expedited hearing before the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), which upheld the cease-and-desist order.Previously, DFHV had issued a similar order in 2020, which OAH upheld, but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, finding insufficient proof of immediate and irreparable harm to the public from Empower’s nonregistration. After that decision, DFHV issued a compliance order requiring Empower to register and provide documentation. When Empower did not respond, DFHV issued another cease-and-desist order, citing specific registration statutes and regulations. OAH found that Empower’s failure to register, along with other statutory violations, posed a substantial risk of immediate and irreparable harm, particularly through the impoundment of vehicles belonging to Empower drivers who were unaware of the risks.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the OAH decision, applying a standard that requires affirmance if OAH made findings of fact on each contested issue, those findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the conclusions flow rationally from the findings. The court held that OAH properly upheld the cease-and-desist order based on the immediate and irreparable harm caused by Empower’s nonregistration, specifically the risk of vehicle impoundments. The court also rejected Empower’s due process arguments regarding discovery, hearing scheduling, and the telephonic nature of the hearing, finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error. The order of OAH was affirmed. View "Yazam, Inc. d/b/a Empower v. D.C. Department of For-Hire Vehicles" on Justia Law

Three former employees of the District of Columbia Department of Forensic Sciences were terminated as part of a reduction in force. They appealed their terminations to the Office of Employee Appeals (OEA), which upheld the terminations in separate orders issued in August 2023. The OEA’s decisions became final in October 2023, and the employees were required to file petitions for judicial review in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia within thirty days. However, each employee filed their petition more than two months after the deadline, attributing the delay to their union counsel’s failure to file timely and seeking extensions based on excusable neglect.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed each petition. In Ms. Gilliam’s case, the court ruled that the thirty-day deadline was mandatory and could not be extended for excusable neglect. In Ms. Washington’s case, the court similarly found the deadline mandatory but also ruled, in the alternative, that she had not shown excusable neglect. In Ms. Ruiz-Reyes’s case, the court did not address whether the deadline was mandatory, instead finding that she had not established excusable neglect.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the thirty-day deadline for seeking Superior Court review of OEA decisions can be extended upon a showing of excusable neglect. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of Ms. Ruiz-Reyes’s petition, finding no abuse of discretion in the determination that she had not shown excusable neglect. However, the court vacated the dismissals of Ms. Gilliam’s and Ms. Washington’s petitions and remanded those cases for further proceedings, instructing the Superior Court to reconsider the excusable neglect issue without relying on an erroneous finding of prejudice to the agency. View "Gilliam v. D.C. Department of Forensic Sciences" on Justia Law

An unlicensed cannabis establishment, DC Smoke, applied for a medical cannabis retailer license under the District of Columbia’s Medical Cannabis Amendment Act of 2022, which allowed such applications during a designated 90-day period. Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) 2C, the only entity permitted by statute to protest such applications at that time, submitted a formal protest to the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board. After a protest hearing and review of evidence, the Board approved DC Smoke’s application in a written order issued on May 1, 2024.Following the Board’s decision, ANC 2C filed a petition for review with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on May 31, 2024. The court questioned the ANC’s standing to seek judicial review, referencing its prior decision in Kopff v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, which held that ANCs are prohibited by D.C. Code § 1-309.10(g) from initiating legal actions in the District’s courts. In response, ANC 2C Commissioner Thomas Lee filed his own petition for review, but did so after the thirty-day deadline required by D.C. App. R. 15(a)(2).The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that ANC 2C lacked standing to petition for review because the statutory prohibition on ANCs initiating legal actions in court was not implicitly repealed by the Medical Cannabis Amendment Act. The court further determined that the requirement to name a proper petitioner in a petition for review is jurisdictional, preventing the ANC from adding or substituting Commissioner Lee as a petitioner. Additionally, the court held that the thirty-day filing deadline for petitions for review is a mandatory claim-processing rule not subject to equitable tolling. As a result, both the ANC’s and Commissioner Lee’s petitions were dismissed, and the court declined to consider the merits of the Board’s licensing decision. View "ANC 2C v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board" on Justia Law

A condominium association in Southwest Washington, D.C., which owns a large complex of over 200 townhomes, challenged the way the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (D.C. Water) calculates a stormwater runoff fee known as the Clean Rivers Impervious Area Charge (CRIAC). The association is classified as a multi-family customer because its water is supplied through several master-metered service lines, rather than each townhome having an individual meter. This classification results in the CRIAC being calculated based on the total impervious surface area of the property, rather than using a tiered system that applies to individually metered residential properties. The association argued that this method, which ties the fee calculation to how the property is metered, is arbitrary and capricious, as the metering method does not affect the amount of stormwater runoff.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to D.C. Water. The court found that D.C. Water’s classification and billing methodology were reasonable and consistent with industry standards, relying on declarations from D.C. Water officials and legislative history. The court also rejected the association’s constitutional and equal protection claims, which were not pursued on appeal.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment on the constitutional claims, as those were not contested on appeal. However, the appellate court vacated the summary judgment on the claim that D.C. Water’s use of metering as a factor in CRIAC calculation was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that D.C. Water had not provided an adequate explanation for why metering should affect the fee, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue. View "Capitol Park IV Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority" on Justia Law

A small business that imports and sells shea butter hired an individual in 2017 to provide communication, marketing, and sales support, particularly focusing on social media. The individual worked under a contract that labeled her as an independent contractor, but after the contract expired, she continued to perform a mix of social media, event, and administrative tasks. She stopped working regularly for the business in September 2018. A dispute arose over unpaid wages, with the individual claiming she was owed for work performed, and the business asserting that she was paid for all work under the terms of the contract.The Office of Wage-Hour (OWH) initially determined that the business owed the individual back wages, liquidated damages, and a statutory penalty. The business appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), arguing that the individual was an independent contractor. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the individual was an employee, not an independent contractor, and awarded damages. On the first petition for review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the individual worked in both capacities—sometimes as an employee and sometimes as an independent contractor—and remanded for OAH to determine the hours worked in each capacity and adjust the damages accordingly. On remand, the ALJ used a percentage-based approach to allocate hours and payments between employee and independent contractor work, ultimately awarding the individual approximately $26,550 in unpaid wages and damages, plus a statutory penalty.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, reviewing the case again, affirmed the OAH’s amended final order. The court held that under the current D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law, employees may pursue claims for disputed wages even if the employer paid conceded wages. The court also held that, due to inadequate recordkeeping by the employer, the burden of proof shifted to the employer to disprove the employee’s evidence regarding hours worked and payments received. View "Shea Yeleen Health & Beauty, LLC v. Office of Wage-Hour" on Justia Law

Green Theory LLC applied for a license to operate a medical cannabis dispensary at a location in Washington, D.C. While the application was pending, a group of local residents, including parents and school administrators, collectively known as the Wolverton Group, filed a protest with the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board. They argued that the proposed dispensary was within 1,000 feet of several schools, raising concerns about the impact on the community and potential violations of federal law. The local Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) did not oppose the application.The Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board dismissed the Wolverton Group’s protest, reasoning that under the Medical Cannabis Amendment Act of 2022, only affected ANCs had standing to protest such license applications. The Board then approved Green Theory’s license. The Wolverton Group and other petitioners sought reconsideration and a stay, both of which were denied. They then filed a petition for review with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, arguing that the Board’s interpretation of the statute was incorrect and unconstitutional, and that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to consider the petition. The court determined that its jurisdiction is limited to “contested cases,” which require a trial-type hearing mandated by statute, regulation, or constitutional right. The court found that the relevant statute only required such a hearing if an ANC filed a protest, which did not occur. The court also rejected arguments that a hearing was required by regulation or constitutional right. Concluding that this was not a contested case, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for review. View "1000 Feet DC Inc. v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board" on Justia Law