Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A woman from North Carolina was found raped and murdered in a Washington, D.C. apartment in March 2017. The victim’s body was discovered bound and stabbed, with evidence of sexual assault. Surveillance footage and ATM records showed her car and credit cards being used in the days following her death. The investigation led to the arrest of El Hadji A. Toure, whose DNA was found at the crime scene and on items used to bind the victim. Video evidence placed Toure near the victim’s apartment shortly before the crime, and he was later seen using her credit and debit cards, always entering the correct PIN. After the murder, Toure’s financial situation improved markedly, as he paid cash for a hotel stay and a car.A jury in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted Toure of multiple offenses, including first-degree murder, sexual abuse, kidnapping, and related charges. He was sentenced to life without release. While his appeal was pending, Toure moved for a new trial, arguing that the government failed to timely disclose disciplinary records (QCARs) for forensic witnesses, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding that, even assuming suppression of favorable evidence, there was no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different given the strength of the other evidence.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed both the convictions and the denial of a new trial. The court held that, although the government failed to timely disclose impeachment evidence, the suppressed material was not material under Brady because the remaining evidence against Toure was overwhelming. The court also found that the prosecutor’s conduct in eliciting certain testimony violated Toure’s confrontation and due process rights, but concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions and denial of a new trial were affirmed, with a remand for merger and resentencing as necessary. View "Toure v. United States" on Justia Law

A shelter providing housing to individuals experiencing homelessness terminated a client's services on an emergency basis, alleging that the client posed an imminent threat to the health or safety of others. The client, who had previously been removed from the shelter without proper notice, returned to the shelter and was involved in a confrontation with security officers. The shelter claimed the client was hostile, pushed a security officer, and made threats. The client challenged the termination, leading to an evidentiary hearing.The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reviewed the case. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the shelter had previously attempted to terminate the client without proper notice and that the client was within his rights to be at the shelter at the time of the incident. The ALJ determined that the security officers escalated the situation by provoking the client, who only pushed the officer after being provoked. The ALJ did not credit the shelter's witness's testimony that the client made threats, finding it uncorroborated and inconsistent with video evidence.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court upheld the ALJ's decision, agreeing that the ALJ correctly applied the law and that the client's actions were not severe enough to warrant emergency termination under the Homeless Services Reform Act. The court found that the ALJ's credibility determinations were supported by substantial evidence and that the shelter's arguments regarding the client's prior misconduct were unpreserved for appeal. The court affirmed the OAH's order, rejecting the shelter's arguments. View "Catholic Charities--801 East Men's Shelter v. Byrd" on Justia Law

Dominique Robison, a bus operator for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), was suspended from her job after bringing her own bottle of urine to a scheduled drug test, which was deemed an automatic failure under WMATA’s policy. She was suspended without pay for 180 days and subsequently filed for unemployment benefits, which were initially granted by the claims examiner due to WMATA's failure to provide evidence of misconduct.WMATA appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), where an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Robison had committed simple misconduct, not gross misconduct, and was disqualified from benefits for the first eight weeks of her unemployment. The ALJ reasoned that Robison’s violation was her first drug-related offense and that WMATA’s decision to suspend rather than terminate her undercut the severity of the offense. The ALJ did not consider WMATA’s argument that Robison was ineligible for benefits because she was merely suspended, not terminated.WMATA then appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The court reviewed whether the ALJ made findings of fact on each materially contested issue, whether substantial evidence supported each finding, and whether the ALJ’s conclusions flowed rationally from its findings. The court concluded that Robison’s actions did not rise to the level of gross misconduct, as there was no direct evidence of drug use or impairment, no demonstrable impact on passenger safety or WMATA’s operations, and it was her first offense. The court also determined that Robison was "unemployed" within the meaning of the statute because she was suspended without pay and did not work during the suspension period.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ’s decision. View "WMATA v. Robison" on Justia Law

The appellant, Michael J. Patschak, was convicted of robbery following an altercation with Officer Davon Todd during a protest. Officer Todd testified that Patschak initiated the altercation by shoving him, causing him to fall, and then twisted and removed Todd's body-worn camera (BWC) from his vest. Patschak then picked up the BWC and placed it in his backpack. Patschak testified that Todd ran into him, causing him to fall, and that he only briefly touched the BWC, which was already twisted. He admitted to picking up the BWC and placing it in his backpack shortly after the altercation.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found Patschak guilty of robbery. Patschak appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court's responses to two juror notes were inadequate. The trial court had instructed the jury that the act of taking the property must be accompanied by the intent to steal, and later clarified that the intent to steal must exist at the time of the taking.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, as a rational juror could find that Patschak's actions constituted a sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching of the BWC from Officer Todd's immediate actual possession. The court also found that the trial court's responses to the juror notes, while not perfect, did not constitute plain error. The court concluded that the trial court's instructions, taken as a whole, adequately addressed the jury's questions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding Patschak's conviction for robbery. View "Patschak v. United States" on Justia Law

Five individuals experienced significant delays in receiving food assistance (SNAP or P-EBT), TANF, or Medicaid benefits. Each requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The ALJs directed the District of Columbia Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide the correct benefits to the claimants, which was eventually done. However, the ALJs also issued orders requiring DHS to correct an "unlawful policy" related to delays caused by internal computer errors or faulty programs.The ALJs' orders were based on the assumption that the delays were due to a systemic issue with DHS's computer systems. DHS representatives mentioned various reasons for the delays, including confusion, human error, and the need for IT tickets to resolve specific issues. In some cases, the delays were attributed to problems with external agencies, such as the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE). Despite these explanations, the ALJs issued broad orders for DHS to correct its policies.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the records did not support the conclusion that the delays were due to a DHS policy or systemic computer errors. The court noted that the ALJs did not hold evidentiary hearings or gather substantial evidence to support their findings. The court also found that the ALJs overstepped their authority by issuing broad injunctive relief without a demonstrated need for such measures.The court vacated the challenged orders, concluding that there was no substantial evidence of a DHS policy causing the delays and that the ALJs had not followed proper procedures in issuing their orders. The court emphasized the need for ALJs to base their decisions on substantial evidence and to consider whether broad injunctive relief is necessary. View "District of Columbia Dep't of Human Services v. Butler" on Justia Law

Peter Farina has lived at the Victor Howell House, a group home for low-income individuals, since 1989. In 2000, the Janet Keenan Housing Corporation (JKHC), a non-profit, purchased the property to maintain it as affordable housing. Recently, JKHC attempted to sell the house to a private third party, leading to two tracks of litigation. The District of Columbia sued JKHC to halt the sale, arguing it violated JKHC’s charitable purposes. As the District and JKHC neared a settlement allowing the sale, Farina sought to intervene but was denied. Farina then filed his own lawsuit, claiming his rights under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) were being violated.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied Farina’s motion to intervene in the District’s case, citing untimeliness and lack of standing. The court approved the settlement between the District and JKHC, which allowed the sale to proceed. In Farina’s separate lawsuit, the court ruled against him, stating his TOPA rights were extinguished by the court-approved settlement and that he lacked standing to bring his UTC claim.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Farina’s TOPA rights were not extinguished by the settlement, as the sale was an arm’s-length transaction and not exempt under TOPA. Farina must be given the opportunity to purchase the property under TOPA. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Farina lacked standing to bring his UTC claim, as he was neither a settlor nor a special interest beneficiary of JKHC. The court affirmed the judgment in the District’s case but vacated the judgment in Farina’s case, remanding it for further proceedings to afford Farina his TOPA rights. View "Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation" on Justia Law

In 2008, a cab driver committed a series of violent attacks against four other cab drivers in the District of Columbia. The attacks included puncturing tires, brandishing a knife, ramming vehicles, and attempting to run over victims. The perpetrator was arrested in March 2009 and found guilty by a jury in June 2011 on thirteen counts, including assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault while armed, and destruction of property.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia sentenced the defendant to an aggregate of 290 months of imprisonment and imposed a total of $1,000 in assessments under the Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act (VVCCA). The defendant appealed, challenging the trial court's decisions on various grounds. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed these issues, resulting in a remand for resentencing on certain counts. The trial court subsequently resentenced the defendant, but the total term of imprisonment remained unchanged.The defendant then filed a pro se motion in January 2022, arguing that his convictions should be dismissed. The trial court denied the motion as procedurally barred, and the defendant appealed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the VVCCA assessments did not constitute fines. The court reasoned that the assessments were mandatory and separate from the punishment imposed, serving primarily to fund the Crime Victim’s Compensation Program. The court affirmed the trial court's imposition of the VVCCA assessments, concluding that the sentence was legal. View "Tornero v. United States" on Justia Law

James Nides filed a lawsuit against DVC Industries, Inc., doing business as The Spice Lab, under the District of Columbia's Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA). Nides alleged that The Spice Lab falsely advertised its "Pink Himalayan Salt" as being hand-mined from the Himalayan Mountains, when it actually came from salt mines in Khewra, Pakistan. Nides claimed that his purchase of the salt was sufficient to give him standing under the CPPA's tester standing provision.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed Nides's complaint. The court found that Nides failed to demonstrate tester standing under the CPPA because his amended complaint did not allege that he purchased the product with the intent to test or evaluate it. The court also noted that Nides's complaint lacked factual support for his claims about the salt's origin and that his counsel's affirmation did not provide sufficient evidence of testing or evaluation.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that Nides's complaint did not meet the requirements for tester standing under the CPPA. The court emphasized that the statutory language requires a plaintiff to allege that they purchased the product with the intent to test or evaluate it, which Nides failed to do. The court also noted that merely observing a product's label or reviewing third-party tests does not constitute the intent to test or evaluate the product as required by the statute.The appellate court concluded that Nides's amended complaint did not plausibly allege that he purchased the salt with the intent to test or evaluate it, and therefore, he lacked standing to sue under the CPPA. The court affirmed the Superior Court's order dismissing the case. View "Nides v. DVC Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

John T. McFarland, a Program Support Specialist with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA), requested a reclassification of his Grade 9 position to Grade 11 in 2011. The desk audit for this request was delayed, and the initial reviewer, Peter Delate, was replaced by Lewis Norman, who completed the audit in 2013 and concluded that the Grade 9 classification was correct. McFarland appealed this decision, but the Director of the District of Columbia’s Department of Human Resources (DCHR) upheld it. McFarland then petitioned for review in Superior Court, which affirmed DCHR’s decision. McFarland appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the decision.In 2017, McFarland filed another petition in Superior Court, presenting new documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request that suggested Delate had initially supported a Grade 11 classification. The Superior Court vacated DCHR’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. On remand, a new specialist reviewed the entire record and concluded that McFarland’s position was correctly classified as Grade 9. McFarland again petitioned for review in Superior Court, which denied his petition and his motion for sanctions against the District of Columbia.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain McFarland’s petition for review under the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA), as the classification decision did not involve a reduction in grade. The court also found that McFarland had not shown that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion for sanctions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of sanctions and remanded the case for dismissal of the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "McFarland v. District of Columbia, Department of Human Resources" on Justia Law

Around 2:00 a.m. in February 2023, Officer Clifford Vanterpool of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department responded to a dispatch call about a suspicious vehicle. Upon arrival at a residential parking lot, he saw two individuals flee from a parked car, leaving its rear door open. The car then began to back out of its spot. Officer Vanterpool blocked the car's exit, exited his vehicle, drew his weapon, and ordered the driver, R.W., to put his hands up. R.W. was subsequently arrested based on evidence obtained after this encounter.R.W. moved to suppress all evidence obtained after Officer Vanterpool's command, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to seize him. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the motion, citing the dispatch call, the flight of the two individuals, the late hour, and R.W.'s movement of the car with the door open as justifications for the seizure. R.W. was convicted of multiple offenses and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the trial court made two legal errors. First, it improperly considered the radio dispatch without information about its source and reliability. Second, it wrongly imputed the flight of R.W.'s companions to him without evidence suggesting a suspicious joint venture. The appellate court concluded that the remaining factors—the late hour and the slight movement of the car—did not provide reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.The Court of Appeals held that the exclusion of all evidence obtained after the unlawful seizure was warranted. Consequently, it vacated R.W.'s convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re R.W." on Justia Law