Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petronella McKenzie sought a second extension of a Civil Protection Order (CPO) against her former husband, Paul Persaud, alleging ongoing fear and past abuse. The parties had previously lived together in Guyana, where Ms. McKenzie testified to experiencing sexual, physical, and emotional abuse. After relocating, she obtained a CPO on consent in February 2020, which was later modified due to threats and extended in 2021 following technical violations by Mr. Persaud. Ms. McKenzie argued that her continued fear, the contentious nature of an ongoing custody case, and changes in visitation arrangements for their child supported her request for another extension.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed Ms. McKenzie’s motion for a second extension. The trial judge considered transcripts from prior hearings, Ms. McKenzie’s testimony about her relationship with Mr. Persaud, and evidence from the custody case. The court acknowledged the history of abuse and threats, as well as Ms. McKenzie’s ongoing fear. However, it found that since the last extension, Mr. Persaud had not committed further violations or demonstrated a current danger to Ms. McKenzie. The court concluded that the evidence did not establish good cause for a second extension of the CPO.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of the extension. The court held that the trial court did not misconstrue the legal standard for “good cause” under D.C. Code § 16-1005(d-1), properly considered the “entire mosaic” of the parties’ relationship, and made sufficient factual findings. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the second extension of the CPO. View "McKenzie v. Persaud" on Justia Law

In October 2022, a man crashed his car into a parked vehicle in southeast Washington, D.C. After the collision, the car’s owner confronted him, and as police arrived, the man fled on foot. Officers pursued and apprehended him, discovering a gun with a large-capacity magazine under a vehicle along his escape route and another large-capacity magazine with ammunition inside his car. He was charged with several firearm-related offenses, including possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device and unlawful possession of ammunition.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss the large-capacity magazine charges on Second Amendment grounds and to suppress the evidence found at the scene, ruling that the search and seizure were justified. After a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition, both based on the magazine found in his car. He was acquitted of other charges. The defendant appealed, challenging the denial of suppression, the sufficiency of the evidence for the large-capacity magazine conviction, the lack of a jury instruction on knowledge, and the constitutionality of the statute.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. After oral argument, the government moved to vacate the large-capacity magazine conviction due to a change in its position on the statute’s constitutionality, which the court granted. The court affirmed the denial of suppression and upheld the unlawful possession of ammunition conviction, holding that the officers’ entry into the car to seize the magazine was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as they had probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of criminal activity. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Miller v. United States" on Justia Law

A defendant, who was sixteen and seventeen years old at the time of two separate armed robberies in Washington, D.C., pleaded guilty to charges arising from those incidents. In the first case, he used a BB gun resembling a real firearm and was sentenced under the Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA) to probation. While on probation, he committed a second robbery with an actual firearm and was sentenced to imprisonment and supervised release, not under the YRA. After completing all sentences and supervision, he moved to have both convictions set aside under a provision of the YRA that allows for such relief after completion of sentence, based on a set of statutory factors.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied both motions. The court found that several statutory factors weighed against the defendant, including the violent nature of the offenses, the fact that the second offense was committed while on supervision for the first, and a later temporary protective order issued against him. The court treated the defendant’s age at the time of the offenses as merely establishing eligibility for YRA relief, did not weigh in his favor the lack of prior YRA sentencing for the first conviction, and interpreted the factor regarding the ability to appreciate risks and consequences as relating to acceptance of responsibility after the fact.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in its application of the statutory factors. Specifically, the appellate court found that the trial court misapplied the factors concerning the defendant’s age, prior YRA sentencing, and ability to appreciate risks and consequences. The appellate court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the motions to set aside the convictions, instructing the lower court to apply the statutory factors correctly. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

Steven Robin was observed by police at an apartment complex parking lot, where officers saw him grab his waistband and duck behind a parked car. Officers believed he had deposited a firearm under the vehicle, and subsequent surveillance and body camera footage supported this account. Robin was arrested, and a firearm was recovered from under the car. DNA testing showed Robin’s DNA on the firearm but not on the magazine. At trial, Robin argued that someone else had placed the firearm there or that officers had planted it, and he presented evidence suggesting improper police handling of the firearm.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over Robin’s trial. The judge instructed the jury that all exhibits except the firearm and ammunition would be available during deliberations, and that the firearm and ammunition could be examined only upon request, with a U.S. Marshal present for security. During deliberations, the jury requested to see the firearm, and the marshal brought it to the jury room. A juror asked if the magazine could be inserted into the gun, and the marshal either did so or allowed a juror to do so, but did not allow ammunition to be loaded. The jury conducted a demonstration with the firearm and found Robin guilty on all charges. After learning of these events, Robin moved for a new trial, arguing that the marshal’s interaction constituted impermissible ex parte communication and violated his constitutional rights. The trial judge denied the motion, finding the marshal’s actions ministerial and consistent with jury instructions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Robin forfeited his claims by failing to object to the jury instructions regarding the marshal’s role. The court found no plain error in the marshal’s conduct, concluding that the marshal’s actions were ministerial and did not require judicial oversight or party input. The court affirmed Robin’s convictions. View "Robin v. United States" on Justia Law

After a minor car accident outside a Safeway parking lot, Brittany Shantel Carrington and her three passengers, including her teenage daughter, became involved in a physical altercation with Brooklyn Brown and Marylynn Jones, the occupants of the other vehicle. The situation escalated from an exchange of insurance information to a brawl. During the fight, Carrington retrieved an umbrella from her car and, according to testimony, used it to strike the windshield of Brown’s vehicle and hit Jones, who sustained injuries. Police arrived and arrested Carrington, recovering the umbrella from her car.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over a bench trial. The trial judge found the facts surrounding the altercation unclear but ultimately credited Brown’s identification of Carrington as the person who broke the windshield and struck Jones with the umbrella. The court found Carrington’s account not credible and determined that she acted out of anger rather than self-defense. Carrington was convicted of simple assault, destruction of property less than $1000, and attempted possession of a prohibited weapon (attempted PPW). She was sentenced to probation and fines, with the execution of the sentence suspended.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed Carrington’s sufficiency of evidence claims de novo. The court affirmed the convictions for simple assault and destruction of property, finding sufficient evidence and no error in the trial court’s credibility determinations or rejection of self-defense. However, the appellate court reversed and vacated the conviction for attempted PPW, holding that the evidence did not establish the umbrella as a “dangerous weapon” under D.C. law in this instance, as there was insufficient proof that it was likely to produce death or great bodily injury in the manner used. View "Carrington v. United States" on Justia Law

After an argument in a third-floor apartment in northeast Washington, D.C., Clement Austin left the premises. Immediately afterward, five gunshots were detected outside the apartment by the ShotSpotter system. Marcia Austin, his aunt, called 911, identifying her nephew as the shooter and describing his appearance and vehicle. Police responded within minutes, apprehended Mr. Austin nearby, and used a key found on him to unlock a blue-green car parked near the apartment, where they recovered a loaded pistol. DNA analysis of the gun’s magazine indicated a high likelihood that Mr. Austin’s DNA was present. Five shell casings matching the gun’s caliber were found outside the apartment. Ms. Austin initially told police she saw Mr. Austin fire the gun, but at trial, she testified she did not see who fired the shots.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over the trial. The government moved to admit the 911 call as an excited utterance. After hearing arguments and Ms. Austin’s testimony about her emotional state and prior traumatic experiences with gun violence, the trial court admitted the call. The government also impeached Ms. Austin’s trial testimony with her prior statements to police. The jury convicted Mr. Austin of unlawful possession of a firearm, carrying a pistol without a license, unlawful discharge of a firearm, possession of an unregistered firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of the 911 call. The court held that ample direct and circumstantial evidence supported the convictions, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 911 call as an excited utterance. The court affirmed Mr. Austin’s convictions. View "Austin v. United States" on Justia Law

Lano/Armada Harbourside, LLC sold five condominium units in Washington, D.C. to Allegiance 2900 K Street LLC in 2013 for $39 million. The sale was documented by a deed that purported to reserve to Lano/Armada a leasehold interest in the property, referencing a separate ground lease agreement between Allegiance (as landlord) and Lano/Armada (as tenant). The ground lease had a term exceeding thirty years, with options to extend up to 117 years, and specified substantial annual rent payments. The ground lease itself was not recorded at the time of the sale, and no taxes were paid on it. Only the deed was recorded, and taxes were paid based on the transfer of the fee simple interest.After a series of assignments and a foreclosure, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, as subrogee of COMM 2013-CCRE12 K STREET NW, LLC, sought to record a deed of foreclosure in 2019. The Recorder of Deeds refused, noting that the ground lease had never been recorded or taxed. Commonwealth then recorded a memorandum of lease and paid the required taxes under protest. Commonwealth sought a refund from the Office of Tax Revenue, which was denied, and then petitioned the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for relief. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the District, finding that the ground lease was a separate taxable transfer and that the statute of limitations had not run because no return for the ground lease had been filed until 2019.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the ground lease was a separate transfer of a leasehold interest, not a mere retention, and was subject to recordation and taxation. The court further held that the statute of limitations for tax collection was not triggered by the earlier deed and tax return, as they did not provide sufficient information about the ground lease. Thus, the District’s collection of taxes on the ground lease was timely. View "Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

During a protest in Lafayette Square, Washington, D.C., police officers were called to remove demonstrators attempting to tear down a statue. The government alleged that Luis Rivera threw two large, T-shaped metal objects at a line of law enforcement officers, injuring two officers. Video evidence and witness testimony identified Rivera as the individual who threw the objects. Rivera was subsequently arrested and charged with multiple counts of assault on a police officer (APO), including felony and misdemeanor charges.The case was tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The jury acquitted Rivera of the more serious felony charges but found him guilty of two counts of misdemeanor APO. During trial, Rivera’s counsel sought to cross-examine several officers about disciplinary matters and potential biases, but the trial judge limited these inquiries, mostly on relevance grounds. After the jury began deliberations, it asked whether the government needed to prove Rivera intended to injure a specific officer. The trial court responded that it was sufficient for the government to show Rivera intended to harm any officer in the group.On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Rivera challenged the trial court’s response to the jury’s note and the limitations placed on his cross-examination of police witnesses. The appellate court held that any error in the trial court’s instruction regarding intent was harmless, as Rivera conceded the general accuracy of the response. The court also found that any error in limiting cross-examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, since the officers in question did not provide identification evidence and the video evidence was decisive. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed Rivera’s convictions. View "Rivera v. United States" on Justia Law

Yazam, Inc., operating as Empower, is a private vehicle-for-hire company that provides a digital app connecting drivers with passengers. Unlike other rideshare platforms, Empower sells monthly subscriptions to drivers, who then set their own fares and retain the full payment from riders. The District of Columbia Department of For-Hire Vehicles (DFHV) ordered Empower to cease operations in the District for failing to register as required by law. Empower requested an expedited hearing before the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), which upheld the cease-and-desist order.Previously, DFHV had issued a similar order in 2020, which OAH upheld, but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, finding insufficient proof of immediate and irreparable harm to the public from Empower’s nonregistration. After that decision, DFHV issued a compliance order requiring Empower to register and provide documentation. When Empower did not respond, DFHV issued another cease-and-desist order, citing specific registration statutes and regulations. OAH found that Empower’s failure to register, along with other statutory violations, posed a substantial risk of immediate and irreparable harm, particularly through the impoundment of vehicles belonging to Empower drivers who were unaware of the risks.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the OAH decision, applying a standard that requires affirmance if OAH made findings of fact on each contested issue, those findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the conclusions flow rationally from the findings. The court held that OAH properly upheld the cease-and-desist order based on the immediate and irreparable harm caused by Empower’s nonregistration, specifically the risk of vehicle impoundments. The court also rejected Empower’s due process arguments regarding discovery, hearing scheduling, and the telephonic nature of the hearing, finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error. The order of OAH was affirmed. View "Yazam, Inc. d/b/a Empower v. D.C. Department of For-Hire Vehicles" on Justia Law

Three former employees of the District of Columbia Department of Forensic Sciences were terminated as part of a reduction in force. They appealed their terminations to the Office of Employee Appeals (OEA), which upheld the terminations in separate orders issued in August 2023. The OEA’s decisions became final in October 2023, and the employees were required to file petitions for judicial review in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia within thirty days. However, each employee filed their petition more than two months after the deadline, attributing the delay to their union counsel’s failure to file timely and seeking extensions based on excusable neglect.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed each petition. In Ms. Gilliam’s case, the court ruled that the thirty-day deadline was mandatory and could not be extended for excusable neglect. In Ms. Washington’s case, the court similarly found the deadline mandatory but also ruled, in the alternative, that she had not shown excusable neglect. In Ms. Ruiz-Reyes’s case, the court did not address whether the deadline was mandatory, instead finding that she had not established excusable neglect.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the thirty-day deadline for seeking Superior Court review of OEA decisions can be extended upon a showing of excusable neglect. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of Ms. Ruiz-Reyes’s petition, finding no abuse of discretion in the determination that she had not shown excusable neglect. However, the court vacated the dismissals of Ms. Gilliam’s and Ms. Washington’s petitions and remanded those cases for further proceedings, instructing the Superior Court to reconsider the excusable neglect issue without relying on an erroneous finding of prejudice to the agency. View "Gilliam v. D.C. Department of Forensic Sciences" on Justia Law