Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An unlicensed cannabis establishment, DC Smoke, applied for a medical cannabis retailer license under the District of Columbia’s Medical Cannabis Amendment Act of 2022, which allowed such applications during a designated 90-day period. Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) 2C, the only entity permitted by statute to protest such applications at that time, submitted a formal protest to the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board. After a protest hearing and review of evidence, the Board approved DC Smoke’s application in a written order issued on May 1, 2024.Following the Board’s decision, ANC 2C filed a petition for review with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on May 31, 2024. The court questioned the ANC’s standing to seek judicial review, referencing its prior decision in Kopff v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, which held that ANCs are prohibited by D.C. Code § 1-309.10(g) from initiating legal actions in the District’s courts. In response, ANC 2C Commissioner Thomas Lee filed his own petition for review, but did so after the thirty-day deadline required by D.C. App. R. 15(a)(2).The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that ANC 2C lacked standing to petition for review because the statutory prohibition on ANCs initiating legal actions in court was not implicitly repealed by the Medical Cannabis Amendment Act. The court further determined that the requirement to name a proper petitioner in a petition for review is jurisdictional, preventing the ANC from adding or substituting Commissioner Lee as a petitioner. Additionally, the court held that the thirty-day filing deadline for petitions for review is a mandatory claim-processing rule not subject to equitable tolling. As a result, both the ANC’s and Commissioner Lee’s petitions were dismissed, and the court declined to consider the merits of the Board’s licensing decision. View "ANC 2C v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board" on Justia Law

A woman was carjacked at gunpoint while filling her car at a gas station in Southeast D.C. The assailant, a stranger to her, wore a hood and brandished a gun, demanding her car keys. She focused mainly on the weapon during the brief encounter, only glancing at his face at the very end. Several hours later, police arrested Andrew Patrick driving her stolen vehicle about four miles away. Officers called the victim to the scene, where Patrick was handcuffed and positioned next to her car, flanked by police. She identified him as her assailant during two drive-by show-up procedures and later in court.The case was tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Patrick moved to suppress the victim’s identifications, arguing the show-up procedures were highly suggestive and unnecessary, given that he was already under arrest and a lineup or photo array could have been used. The trial court denied the motion, finding the procedures were not unduly suggestive and that the identifications were reliable, citing the victim’s opportunity to observe the assailant and her certainty.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether admitting the identifications violated Patrick’s due process rights. The court held that the show-up procedures were extraordinarily and unnecessarily suggestive, as Patrick was already under arrest and there was no urgency requiring a show-up. The identifications lacked independent indicia of reliability, given the victim’s limited opportunity to observe the assailant and her generic description. The court found constitutional error in admitting the identifications and reversed Patrick’s convictions for armed carjacking and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, but affirmed his other weapons-related convictions, finding those were not impacted by the identifications. View "Patrick v. United States" on Justia Law

In July 2015, Jerome Diggs was fatally shot multiple times. Before dying, Diggs identified Gary Proctor as the shooter in calls and statements to bystanders. Witnesses placed Proctor near the scene, and forensic evidence linked ammunition found in Proctor’s room to the murder weapon. Security footage showed Proctor exchanging his phone, which contained incriminating photos, the day after the murder. Investigators uncovered possible motives, including a drug debt, a dispute over drug sales, and Diggs’s anticipated testimony at a civil protection order (CPO) hearing involving Proctor’s family.The government charged Proctor with first-degree premeditated murder while armed and related firearm offenses in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The trial court made several pretrial evidentiary rulings, including admitting Diggs’s statements about Proctor’s attempt to prevent his CPO testimony under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. During trial, Proctor moved for mistrial multiple times, citing references to his prior incarceration and alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. The trial court denied these motions, issued curative instructions, and ultimately the jury convicted Proctor on all counts. At sentencing, the court took judicial notice of Proctor’s prior murder conviction, allowing a life sentence without release.On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Proctor challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of mistrial motions, evidentiary rulings, and sentencing procedures. The Court of Appeals affirmed all convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying mistrial or admitting evidence, and sentencing procedures were proper. The court declined to address ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, granting Proctor thirty days to file a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110 to develop the record on those claims. View "Proctor v. United States" on Justia Law

A condominium association in Southwest Washington, D.C., which owns a large complex of over 200 townhomes, challenged the way the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (D.C. Water) calculates a stormwater runoff fee known as the Clean Rivers Impervious Area Charge (CRIAC). The association is classified as a multi-family customer because its water is supplied through several master-metered service lines, rather than each townhome having an individual meter. This classification results in the CRIAC being calculated based on the total impervious surface area of the property, rather than using a tiered system that applies to individually metered residential properties. The association argued that this method, which ties the fee calculation to how the property is metered, is arbitrary and capricious, as the metering method does not affect the amount of stormwater runoff.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to D.C. Water. The court found that D.C. Water’s classification and billing methodology were reasonable and consistent with industry standards, relying on declarations from D.C. Water officials and legislative history. The court also rejected the association’s constitutional and equal protection claims, which were not pursued on appeal.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment on the constitutional claims, as those were not contested on appeal. However, the appellate court vacated the summary judgment on the claim that D.C. Water’s use of metering as a factor in CRIAC calculation was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that D.C. Water had not provided an adequate explanation for why metering should affect the fee, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue. View "Capitol Park IV Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority" on Justia Law

In this case, a condominium unit was sold at a foreclosure sale in 2014 to Tyroshi Investments after the original owner defaulted on both her mortgage and condominium assessments. The condominium association conducted the sale, and Tyroshi subsequently rented out the unit. In 2015, the mortgage and deed of trust were transferred to U.S. Bank, which then initiated its own judicial foreclosure and purchased the unit at a second sale in 2016. Both Tyroshi and U.S. Bank recorded their deeds at different times, and for a period, Tyroshi’s tenants continued to occupy the unit while U.S. Bank paid taxes and assessments. In 2020, Tyroshi was denied access to the unit, leading to litigation over rightful ownership.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bench trial and determined that U.S. Bank’s claims to quiet title and invalidate the 2014 foreclosure sale were timely, applying a fifteen-year statute of limitations for actions “for the recovery of lands” under D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1). The court declared the 2014 sale invalid and found U.S. Bank to be the legal owner. Tyroshi appealed, arguing that the claims were untimely.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the fifteen-year limitations period applies only to possessory actions, such as ejectment or adverse possession, not to claims like wrongful foreclosure or breach of contract, which are subject to shorter limitations periods. The court found that U.S. Bank’s claims were time-barred, except for a portion of its unjust enrichment claim related to payments made within three years of the suit. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of the unjust enrichment claim. View "Tyroshi Investments, LLC v. U.S. Bank, NA, Successor Trustee to LaSalle Bank NA" on Justia Law

Three public interest organizations brought suit against a utility company that provides natural gas services in the District of Columbia, alleging that the company violated the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) by making false and misleading statements about the environmental effects of its natural gas. The organizations claimed these statements appeared in customer bills, on the company’s website, and in other public documents. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to address the alleged unfair and deceptive trade practices.The utility company responded by filing a special motion to dismiss under the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act, followed by a motion to dismiss under Superior Court Civil Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The company argued that the CPPA does not create a right of action against entities regulated by the Public Service Commission (PSC), citing D.C. Code § 28-3903(c)(2)(B) and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decision in Gomez v. Independence Management of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 2009). The public interest organizations countered that the statutory limitation only applied to the Department of Licensing and Consumer Protection, not to private actors like themselves, and that subsequent amendments to the CPPA had rendered Gomez obsolete. The Superior Court granted the utility’s motion to dismiss, finding that Gomez remained controlling and that the CPPA’s exemptions for PSC-regulated entities had not been altered by later amendments.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. The court held that, although the plain text of the CPPA does not expressly bar private suits against PSC-regulated entities, binding precedent from Gomez requires that the limitations in D.C. Code § 28-3903(c)(2) apply to private actions as well. Therefore, public interest organizations may not sue entities regulated by the PSC under the CPPA. View "Client Earth v. Washington Gas Light Company" on Justia Law

The appellant alleged that, after attending Long Island University and New York University and repaying her student loans, her name was fraudulently used in 1993 to certify additional federal student loans without her consent. She claimed that the universities signed her name on false loan applications, withheld refunds, and that the United States Department of Education attempted to collect on these fraudulent loans through debt collectors who used unlawful practices. The Department of Education ultimately garnished her tax refund and threatened to garnish her Social Security checks. The appellant filed suit against the Department of Education, the universities, the debt collectors, and others.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against the universities and debt collectors for lack of personal jurisdiction, relying on the government-contacts exception. The court dismissed claims against other defendants on different grounds. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the other defendants but, regarding the dismissal based on the government-contacts exception, certified questions to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals about the scope of that exception under District law.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that, under the District’s long-arm statute, the government-contacts exception to personal jurisdiction applies only if a defendant can establish that asserting jurisdiction based on the conduct at issue would violate the First Amendment. The court clarified that its prior decision in Rose v. Silver is binding and limits the exception to circumstances implicating First Amendment rights, even if this interpretation is arguably in tension with an earlier case, Environmental Research International, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc. The court declined to address whether the contacts alleged in this case fell within the exception, as that would depend on a First Amendment analysis. View "N'Jai v. U.S. Department of Education" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant was convicted in 2010 of several offenses, including aggravated assault while armed, after shooting an individual who was set to testify against his brother. The victim suffered serious injuries. The appellant was sentenced to a total of 336 months in prison, a sentence that was below the statutory maximum for the most serious offense. After an initial appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded for merger of certain offenses and resentencing. The trial court resentenced the appellant to the same term, and the Court of Appeals again affirmed, rejecting arguments that the sentence was improperly enhanced based on prior convictions.Subsequently, the appellant succeeded in having one of his prior convictions vacated. He then moved for resentencing in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, arguing that his sentence had been enhanced based on the now-vacated conviction and that his two remaining prior convictions should not have counted separately for enhancement purposes. The trial court granted resentencing, but determined that the two remaining convictions qualified as separate prior felonies under the relevant statute and resentenced the appellant to 240 months, again below the statutory maximum but above the advisory range in the Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court erred in applying the sentencing enhancement statute when the two prior convictions were adjudicated together. The court declined to reach the substantive statutory interpretation question, holding that because the sentence imposed was below the statutory maximum, it was not reviewable on the grounds asserted. The court reaffirmed that discretionary sentencing within statutory limits, even if based on an alleged misapplication of the Guidelines or enhancement statutes, is not subject to appellate review unless it involves materially false factual information. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

A man was convicted by a jury of several offenses related to a shooting outside a nightclub in Washington, D.C. in July 2021. The evidence showed that the defendant, who was twenty years old at the time, shot another individual and then hid the firearm. He was identified by a witness, and DNA evidence linked him to the recovered handgun. The defendant initially told police he was not the shooter, but at trial, he admitted to firing the gun, claiming self-defense.Prior to trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the defendant moved to dismiss charges related to carrying a pistol without a license, possession of an unregistered firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. He argued that the District’s laws, which require individuals to be at least twenty-one years old to obtain a firearm registration or license, violated the Second Amendment, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. The trial court denied the motion, finding the age-based restrictions consistent with the Second Amendment and historical firearm regulation. At trial, the government impeached the defendant’s credibility by highlighting inconsistencies between his initial statements and his trial testimony. The jury convicted him on all counts.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the constitutionality of the District’s age-based firearm registration and licensing statutes and the propriety of the government’s arguments regarding the defendant’s credibility. The court held that the age-based statutes are constitutional because they are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court also found that the government’s arguments about the defendant’s change in defense theory were not improper. The court affirmed the convictions but remanded for the limited purpose of merging certain convictions and resentencing as necessary. View "Picon v. United States" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant was convicted of simple assault with a bias enhancement after an incident at a Metro station. The government’s evidence showed that the appellant approached a group, made derogatory remarks about their sexual orientation, and physically assaulted one of them multiple times. The assailant was later apprehended at a different Metro station and identified as the appellant. The charges were eventually narrowed to simple assault with a bias enhancement, and the appellant was found guilty by a jury.Prior to trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the appellant objected to the composition of the jury venire, arguing that it did not reflect a fair cross-section of the community, as only three of fifty-four potential jurors appeared to be African American. The trial judge denied the motion to strike the panel, finding that the appellant had not shown systematic exclusion of a group from the jury selection process. The judge also denied a subsequent, untimely request for access to jury selection records, reasoning that the request came only after the motion to strike had been denied and that no prior efforts had been made to obtain such records.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and the fair cross-section claim. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the testimony of the arresting officer and the circumstances of the arrest. The court also held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to strike the jury panel or the belated request for jury selection records, finding that the denial was based on the untimeliness of the request rather than an improper threshold requirement. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Brown v. United States" on Justia Law