Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involves a challenge to the District of Columbia Public Service Commission’s approval of Potomac Electric Power Company’s (Pepco) 2024–2026 multi-year electric rate plan. The petitioners, the Office of the People’s Counsel and the Apartment and Office Building Association, objected to the Commission’s decision to approve a $123.4 million rate increase following a “legislative-style” hearing that did not permit the presentation or cross-examination of witnesses. The petitioners argued that the process failed to address significant factual disputes, particularly concerning the Effective Rate Adjustment (ERA) and Bill Stabilization Adjustment (BSA), mechanisms affecting rates for large commercial customers. They maintained that an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve these factual disagreements.The Public Service Commission, after receiving written testimony and briefs, denied requests for an evidentiary hearing and approved Pepco’s rate plan with modifications. It concluded that there were no material factual disputes necessitating cross-examination or oral testimony, and thus a legislative-style hearing was sufficient. The Commission also rejected applications for reconsideration, reiterating its view that the contested issues were either legal or policy-based rather than factual. However, there were substantial discrepancies between the parties’ calculations regarding the BSA deferral balances and concerns about the ERA’s impact on certain customer classes.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that this proceeding was a “contested case” under the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act and that the Commission was required to hold an evidentiary, trial-type hearing because there were genuine disputes over material facts. The court held that the Commission’s failure to provide such a hearing rendered its orders unsustainable. Accordingly, the court vacated the Commission’s orders and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Commission to hold an evidentiary hearing. View "Office of the People's Counsel v. District of Columbia Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

The case arose from an altercation between the appellant and a bicyclist in Washington, D.C. The bicyclist, seeing the appellant in apparent distress, approached to offer assistance. The appellant reacted aggressively, leading to a struggle over the bicycle. During the confrontation, the appellant stabbed the bicyclist with a knife, causing significant injury. Eyewitnesses and video evidence captured portions of the incident, and the appellant was arrested at the scene. At trial, the appellant testified about his mental health issues and claimed he acted in self-defense, while evidence was presented regarding his erratic behavior and mental state at the time of the incident.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia conducted a bench trial in which the appellant represented himself with standby counsel. The trial court found the government had disproven self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, based in significant part on the credibility of an eyewitness and video evidence. The court convicted the appellant of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault causing significant bodily injury, and imposed a sentence of imprisonment followed by supervised release.On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding self-defense and argued that the trial court erred by not conducting a Frendak inquiry to determine whether he intelligently and voluntarily waived an insanity defense. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the trial court’s findings on that issue. However, the appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a Frendak inquiry, given the evidence of the appellant’s mental illness and statements at trial. The case was remanded for the trial court to conduct the required inquiry and take further action as appropriate based on its findings. View "Campbell v. United States" on Justia Law

Applicants sought to build two principal residences on a single residential property in the Forest Hills neighborhood of Washington, D.C. Because the proposed construction did not comply with the minimum lot width requirement for the area, the applicants, Nezahat and Paul Harrison, requested a special exception for a “theoretical subdivision” from the District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA), which would allow multiple principal buildings on one record lot by waiving certain development standards, including lot width. In the alternative, they applied for a variance from the minimum lot width requirement. Neighbors who held an easement over the property opposed the applications, expressing concerns about property values, stormwater drainage, and neighborhood character.The BZA considered both requests. The D.C. Office of Planning and the local Advisory Neighborhood Commission both recommended approval of the special exception, though opinions varied about the variance. After public hearings, the BZA granted the special exception for the theoretical subdivision, thereby waiving the minimum lot width requirement, but denied the request for a variance. The neighbors, Deborah Hernandez and Mary Lee, appealed, arguing that the BZA could not lawfully waive lot width requirements through a special exception while denying a variance for the same requirement.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the BZA’s decision. The court held that the applicable zoning regulations allow the BZA to grant a theoretical subdivision as a special exception and to waive minimum lot width requirements without the need to also grant a variance. The court found that the standards for special exceptions and variances are independent and that the BZA did not act arbitrarily. The court affirmed the BZA’s decision. View "Hernandez v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment" on Justia Law

A developer purchased property in the Brookland neighborhood that included a historic mural and an adjacent parking lot providing clear sightlines to the mural. Another individual, who sought to preserve the mural, had previously contracted to buy the property but the deal fell through amid allegations of contract forgery by the seller. The developer, holding a promissory note secured by a deed of trust, initiated foreclosure and ultimately purchased the property at auction. The unsuccessful buyer accused the developer of fraud and publicly made statements labeling him as corrupt and claiming he had “problems with the DOJ” and had taken the property “by theft and fraud.” These statements were repeated online via a media outlet controlled by the unsuccessful buyer.The developer sued for defamation and false light in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The defendant moved to dismiss under the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act, arguing that his statements were protected advocacy on matters of public interest and that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure, thus requiring proof of actual malice. The trial court found the developer to be a limited-purpose public figure and denied most of the motion, allowing the claims to proceed except those related to certain statements outside the statute of limitations.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the Anti-SLAPP Act applied because the statements addressed issues of public interest, such as urban development and historic preservation. The court concluded that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure and therefore must show actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that the developer failed to demonstrate that the statements were false or made with actual malice. As a result, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the Anti-SLAPP motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Capitol Intelligence Group, Inc. v. Waldman" on Justia Law

Police officers stopped an individual driving a car in the District of Columbia, citing two reasons: failure to use a turn signal when making a turn and the presence of tint on the car’s front windshield. During the stop, an officer saw a handgun in the glove box, leading to a search that uncovered both the handgun and PCP. The officer testified that any tint on a front windshield is illegal, but did not measure the level of tint or issue a notice of infraction for either violation.After being charged, the individual moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the stop lacked a lawful basis because D.C. law allows some level of front-windshield tint, and there was no corroboration of the alleged turn signal violation. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the motion to suppress, finding that the officer had probable cause to believe a tint violation occurred, even though the officer was mistaken about the law. The court did not rely on the alleged failure to signal, finding it questionable.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the government failed to show the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion that the windshield tint was illegal, since the law permitted some tint and there was no evidence the tint actually exceeded legal limits. The officer’s misunderstanding of the law was not objectively reasonable. The court also found no basis to remand for reconsideration of the turn signal issue, as the government did not present sufficient evidence at the suppression hearing. As a result, the appellate court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Griffin v. United States" on Justia Law

A tenant who lived in an apartment complex for twelve years experienced severe habitability problems, including lack of heat for seven years, no functioning toilet for at least a year, no refrigerator for two years, a collapsed ceiling, and frequent mice infestations. The tenant sued his landlord, requesting only monetary damages, and later alleged that the landlord attempted to force him out by cutting off his electricity. The landlord argued it had offered relocation assistance or money to persuade the tenant to move out so renovations could be completed.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found that the landlord breached the implied warranty of habitability, as the record showed the apartment was uninhabitable and the landlord did not contest the poor conditions. However, the court reduced the damages award to $7,500, reasoning that the tenant failed to mitigate his damages by refusing to vacate the apartment when offered relocation. The court also ordered the tenant to vacate within seven days, though the propriety of this order was not challenged on appeal.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a tenant does not have a duty to mitigate damages by vacating a rental unit in response to a landlord’s request for renovation unless the landlord first complies with D.C. Code § 42-3505.01(f)(1). This statute requires landlords to follow a specific process involving notice and approval by the Rent Administrator before temporarily recovering possession for renovations. The appellate court found no evidence the landlord had complied with this process. It reversed the trial court’s reduced damages award and remanded for a recalculation, directing that the tenant must be awarded at least $22,788. View "Woodley v. Woodberry Village Apartment" on Justia Law

Late at night in January 2019, three men were shot and killed on a street in Southeast Washington, D.C. The appellant, along with a co-defendant, was charged with three counts of first-degree (premeditated) murder for the deaths of these men. The government’s evidence at trial included eyewitness accounts, evidence of a burned vehicle allegedly used in the shooting, call records linking the appellant to one of the victims, and expert testimony based on historical cell site location information (CSLI) to track the appellant’s movements. Additionally, the appellant was charged with fleeing a law enforcement officer after leading police on a high-speed chase when they attempted to arrest him.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over the pretrial and trial proceedings. The motions court admitted the government’s CSLI expert testimony over the co-defendant’s objection, declined to hold a Daubert hearing, and relied on cross-examination to address reliability concerns. After trial, the appellant was convicted on all counts, while the co-defendant was acquitted at the close of the government’s case. The appellant was sentenced to consecutive terms for the murder convictions and a concurrent sentence for fleeing.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the motions court did not properly fulfill its gatekeeping function under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Motorola Inc. v. Murray, failing to assess whether the expert reliably applied cell site analysis methods to the case’s facts. The court found this error was not harmless due to the centrality of the expert’s testimony. The court reversed the murder convictions and remanded for further proceedings, including a possible new trial, but affirmed the flight conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in the handling of a sleeping juror issue related to that charge. View "Willis v. United States" on Justia Law

Two men were tried together for a shooting that resulted in the death of one person and injuries to two others. The evidence against them included surveillance videos, cell phone and social media records, DNA evidence, and expert testimony. The key factual dispute at trial was whether the two defendants were the men captured on video committing the shooting, as the government alleged. The prosecution also presented testimony from a firearms examiner who stated that there was “extremely strong support” that shell casings found at the scene were fired from a rifle recovered near the defendants’ crashed vehicle. One defendant was also linked to a distinctive blue puffer jacket seen on the shooter in surveillance footage.In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, both defendants were convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to kill, and multiple firearm offenses. The trial judge permitted the firearms examiner’s testimony over defense objections, concluding it was consistent with existing law so long as the expert did not claim absolute certainty. The trial judge also limited defense counsel’s closing argument about the prevalence of blue puffer jackets, sustaining an objection to a portion of that argument.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals assumed for argument’s sake that it was error to allow the firearms expert’s testimony and agreed that restricting the defense’s closing argument about the jacket was an abuse of discretion. However, the court held that any errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including video, DNA, and witness identification. The court ordered that certain firearm convictions merge, leaving each defendant with one conviction for possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and vacated one defendant’s conviction for carrying a rifle or shotgun outside the home, finding the statutory prohibition unconstitutional. All other convictions were affirmed. View "Stevenson v. United States" on Justia Law

The case concerns the termination of the General Counsel of the District of Columbia Retirement Board (DCRB), who had served in that role for nearly fourteen years. Following an internal investigation in 2021–2022, DCRB found that the General Counsel had failed to properly investigate and disclose conflict-of-interest allegations about a prior Executive Director. Based on these findings, DCRB initiated removal proceedings, ultimately deciding to terminate the General Counsel. The termination notice advised her of her right to appeal to the Office of Employee Appeals (OEA), where she argued, among other things, that her removal violated a regulatory “ninety-day rule.”Before OEA, the General Counsel claimed that she was a Career Service employee, which would entitle her to removal protections and OEA review. DCRB did not contest this characterization before OEA. OEA found in her favor and ordered her reinstatement, concluding that DCRB had violated the ninety-day rule. DCRB then petitioned the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for review, newly contending that the General Counsel was not in the Career Service but instead was a Senior Executive Attorney in the Legal Service—a category of at-will employees not entitled to OEA review or removal protections. The Superior Court found factual disputes regarding her employment status and remanded the case to OEA to determine its jurisdiction.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the statutory provisions governing DCRB and the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act unambiguously classified the General Counsel as a Senior Executive Attorney in the Legal Service, making her an at-will employee not entitled to OEA review. The court concluded that the Superior Court committed clear error by remanding for factual findings on this question. Accordingly, it reversed the Superior Court’s order and directed that Ms. Sampson’s OEA appeal be dismissed. View "District of Columbia Retirement Board v. Office of Employee Appeals" on Justia Law

A police officer employed by the Metropolitan Police Department experienced a data breach that exposed sensitive information of numerous employees. In response, the officer filed a putative class action in Superior Court for the District of Columbia, naming the District, certain government entities, and several private technology contractors as defendants. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to safeguard employees’ data.During the proceedings, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed certain contractor defendants without prejudice, leaving the government defendants and a few contractors. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted the District’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the Metropolitan Police Department and the Office of the Chief Technology Officer could not be sued as unincorporated government bodies, and that sovereign immunity barred the claims against the District. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Subsequently, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed without prejudice the remaining private contractor defendants and asked the Superior Court to close the case. The Superior Court closed the case, prompting the plaintiff to appeal both the dismissal of her claims against the District and the denial of reconsideration.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that because the plaintiff dismissed her claims against the final contractor defendants without prejudice, the trial court’s order was not final as to all parties and claims. The court explained that dismissals without prejudice do not resolve the merits and thus do not confer appellate jurisdiction, except in rare circumstances. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the order below was not a final, appealable order. View "Moore v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law