Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A small business that imports and sells shea butter hired an individual in 2017 to provide communication, marketing, and sales support, particularly focusing on social media. The individual worked under a contract that labeled her as an independent contractor, but after the contract expired, she continued to perform a mix of social media, event, and administrative tasks. She stopped working regularly for the business in September 2018. A dispute arose over unpaid wages, with the individual claiming she was owed for work performed, and the business asserting that she was paid for all work under the terms of the contract.The Office of Wage-Hour (OWH) initially determined that the business owed the individual back wages, liquidated damages, and a statutory penalty. The business appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), arguing that the individual was an independent contractor. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the individual was an employee, not an independent contractor, and awarded damages. On the first petition for review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the individual worked in both capacities—sometimes as an employee and sometimes as an independent contractor—and remanded for OAH to determine the hours worked in each capacity and adjust the damages accordingly. On remand, the ALJ used a percentage-based approach to allocate hours and payments between employee and independent contractor work, ultimately awarding the individual approximately $26,550 in unpaid wages and damages, plus a statutory penalty.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, reviewing the case again, affirmed the OAH’s amended final order. The court held that under the current D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law, employees may pursue claims for disputed wages even if the employer paid conceded wages. The court also held that, due to inadequate recordkeeping by the employer, the burden of proof shifted to the employer to disprove the employee’s evidence regarding hours worked and payments received. View "Shea Yeleen Health & Beauty, LLC v. Office of Wage-Hour" on Justia Law

The appellant was represented by an attorney in a criminal contempt proceeding after allegedly violating a civil protective order. During the course of representation, the appellant twice made statements to his attorney threatening to kill the Assistant Attorney General prosecuting his case, including specific language and gestures indicating an intent to cause harm. The attorney, disturbed by these threats, initially sought to withdraw from representation and later disclosed the threats to the court after being ordered to do so. The attorney subsequently testified before a grand jury and at trial regarding the threats, which led to the appellant being charged and convicted by a jury of threatening a public official and obstruction of justice.Following conviction in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the appellant challenged the admissibility of his attorney’s testimony, arguing that the statements were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that the threats were not made for the purpose of seeking legal advice and thus were not privileged. On appeal, a division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals initially vacated the convictions, holding that the statements were privileged and their admission was not harmless error. The United States successfully petitioned for en banc review, and the full court vacated the division’s decision, limiting the scope of review to the attorney-client privilege issue.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that the attorney-client privilege does not protect communications that themselves constitute criminal threats to cause death or serious bodily harm. The court reasoned that such threats are an abuse of the attorney-client relationship and fall outside the privilege, regardless of whether the technical elements of the privilege are otherwise met. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s admission of the attorney’s testimony and remanded the case for consideration of the appellant’s remaining arguments. View "Moore v. United States" on Justia Law

A woman returning home late at night observed a man, later identified as the defendant, standing near the entrance of their shared condominium building with his lower body exposed. The man, wearing a sweatshirt that did not cover his genitalia, followed the woman as she entered the building, attempted to force his way inside, and did not try to cover himself. After a confrontation inside the building, the woman took what she believed to be the man’s phone and exited to call the police. The man followed her outside, continued to expose himself, and engaged in a physical altercation with her.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially convicted the defendant of lewd, indecent, or obscene acts in violation of D.C. Code § 22-1312 after a bench trial. The conviction was vacated following a post-conviction motion for ineffective assistance of counsel, and a new trial was scheduled. The government’s request to continue the trial, due to the unavailability of the key witness, was granted over the defendant’s objection. At the second trial, the court again found the defendant guilty, concluding that his exposure on the walkway in front of the building—an area open to public view—constituted a violation of the statute.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that D.C. Code § 22-1312 is not limited to conduct occurring on public property; rather, it applies to indecent exposures in any location “in public,” meaning in open view or before the public at large, regardless of property ownership. The court also determined that any error in granting the government’s motion to continue the trial was harmless, as the defendant failed to show prejudice. The conviction was affirmed. View "Flowers v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Police received reports of a group committing robberies or attempted robberies in a white Nissan Rogue that had been reported stolen. Officers tracked the vehicle, observed it being driven recklessly, and saw it crash. Four individuals, including E.A., fled from the car. E.A. was apprehended shortly after the crash, frisked, and found to have a handgun in his sweatshirt pocket. He was subsequently charged with carrying a pistol without a license and possession of an unregistered firearm.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied E.A.’s motion to suppress the handgun, finding that officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and frisk him based on his association with the group suspected of recent robberies and the stolen vehicle, as well as his flight from the crash. The court also concluded that, even if the officers’ actions exceeded the scope of a Terry stop, they had probable cause to arrest E.A. for multiple offenses, justifying a search incident to arrest. E.A. was adjudicated delinquent on both firearms charges and appealed, challenging the denial of his suppression motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and frisk E.A., relying on the collective knowledge from radio dispatches, corroborated by officers’ observations and the circumstances of the stop. The court further held that the officers’ use of handcuffs and drawn weapons did not convert the stop into an arrest, given the safety concerns and flight risk. Therefore, the search and seizure of the handgun did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the judgment was affirmed. View "In re E.A." on Justia Law

A group of ten Black men, including the appellant, were conversing on a sidewalk in Ward Four of the District of Columbia when four officers from the Metropolitan Police Department’s Gun Recovery Unit approached them as part of a firearm interdiction operation. The officers, wearing tactical vests and displaying police equipment, approached the group without any specific suspicion of criminal activity. One officer, DelBorrell, approached the appellant from behind and asked if he was carrying a firearm. The appellant denied it and twice lifted his shirt to show his waistband. The officer then asked the appellant to “hike” his pants up, which he did. Another officer then noticed a bulge in the appellant’s groin area, believed it to be a firearm, and after a brief struggle, the officers recovered a gun from the appellant’s pants.The appellant was charged with eight firearm-related offenses. He moved to suppress the firearm and a subsequent statement, arguing they were the result of an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the motion, finding that the appellant was not seized until after he raised his pants, at which point the officers had reasonable suspicion based on the observed bulge. The appellant was convicted on all counts following a trial on stipulated facts and appealed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the appellant was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the officer requested that he raise his pants. The court found that, considering the officers’ show of authority, the accusatory and repetitive questioning, and the appellant’s status as a Black man in a highly policed area, a reasonable person in his position would not have felt free to leave. Because the seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause, it was unreasonable. The court vacated the convictions and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carter v. United States" on Justia Law

A man was charged with multiple counts of first- and second-degree child sex abuse and related offenses, based on allegations that he repeatedly sexually assaulted his then-girlfriend’s young daughter over a period of nearly two years. The complainant, who was nine to ten years old at the time of the alleged abuse, disclosed the assaults to her mother about ten months after the accused moved out of their home. Upon learning of the allegations, the mother, who was a police officer, recorded a nearly twenty-minute video of her conversation with her daughter, in which the child described the alleged abuse in detail, including some claims not raised at trial and references to uncharged violent conduct. Both the complainant and her mother testified at trial, and the prosecution sought to admit the entire recording as evidence.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia admitted the full recording under the “report-of-rape” rule, over the defendant’s objection, and instructed the jury that the recording was not to be considered for the truth of its contents but rather to show that a report was made and to evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses. The jury found the defendant guilty on several counts, and he was sentenced to 384 months in prison. The defendant appealed, arguing that admitting the entire recording was erroneous and prejudicial.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by admitting the entire recording, as the “report-of-rape” rule only allows for the admission of enough details to show that a report was made, not the full substance or highly prejudicial content. The court found the error was not harmless and reversed the convictions, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when a homeowner contracted with a tree nursery company to purchase and install six trees on her property in Washington, D.C. The homeowner sought to restore privacy lost when a neighbor removed existing trees, and she wanted the new trees to provide “evergreen screening.” After installation, she was dissatisfied with the results, noting that the trees did not achieve the desired screening effect and that two of the trees died within a year. She refused to pay the remaining contract balance, prompting the nursery to sue for breach of contract. The homeowner counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and violations of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA).The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bench trial. The court found that the contract required the nursery only to select, install, and monitor six trees for six weeks, not to guarantee any particular screening effect. The court ruled in favor of the nursery on its contract claim and on most of the homeowner’s counterclaims, except for a finding that the nursery breached the implied warranty of merchantability as to one tree (the dogwood) that died soon after installation. The court rejected the homeowner’s claims regarding the CPPA and the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and denied her motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment on all grounds. The appellate court held that the contract did not obligate the nursery to provide evergreen screening, that the nursery fulfilled its contractual duties, and that the homeowner breached the contract by withholding payment. The court also affirmed the trial court’s application of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to the intentional CPPA claims and agreed that the implied warranty of merchantability was breached only as to the one tree that died. View "Galvin v. Ruppert Nurseries, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident in which the appellant shot his longtime friend during an argument over a small debt. The altercation escalated when the appellant, sitting in his car, pointed a gun at the friend and fired three shots, injuring him. The friend fled, and the appellant left the scene, later crashing his car. Police identified and arrested the appellant about six weeks after the shooting. He was indicted for assault with intent to kill and related firearm offenses.During pretrial proceedings in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the appellant notified the court and the government of his intent to raise an insanity defense. He provided notice that his expert, Dr. Lally, would testify that the appellant met the legal standard for insanity, basing his opinion largely on a report by Dr. Grant, which detailed the appellant’s history of severe mental illness and hospitalizations but did not reach a definitive conclusion on insanity. The government argued that the expert notice was insufficient under Rule 16 and moved to preclude Dr. Lally’s testimony. The trial court agreed, finding the notice deficient and, without allowing the appellant an opportunity to cure the issue, barred Dr. Lally from testifying. As a result, the appellant abandoned his insanity defense. The trial proceeded on the issue of guilt, and the jury convicted the appellant of aggravated assault while armed and related offenses, acquitting him of the most serious charge.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the appellant’s expert notice satisfied the requirements of Rule 16 as it existed at the time. The court further found that, even if there had been a deficiency, the trial court’s sanction of precluding the expert was disproportionate and an abuse of discretion, especially since the appellant was not given a chance to cure any perceived defect. The court provisionally vacated the convictions and remanded for a new trial limited to the insanity defense. If the jury finds the appellant not guilty by reason of insanity, the convictions remain vacated; otherwise, the convictions may be reinstated. The court also found no reversible error in the trial court’s handling of the self-defense instruction. View "Farmer v. United States" on Justia Law

A law enforcement agency in the District of Columbia, responsible for supervising individuals on supervised release, imposed GPS monitoring on a supervisee without judicial or Parole Commission authorization. The agency’s internal regulations permitted its officers to unilaterally require GPS monitoring as an administrative sanction, and this practice had been applied to thousands of supervisees over two decades. In this instance, the supervisee was placed on GPS monitoring twice, first for a positive drug test and then for submitting questionable urine samples. Subsequently, police investigating an armed robbery used the agency’s GPS data to identify and locate the supervisee, leading to his arrest and the recovery of stolen property and a firearm.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed the supervisee’s motion to suppress the GPS evidence and its fruits, following the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Davis v. United States, 306 A.3d 89 (D.C. 2023), which held that the agency lacked statutory authority to impose GPS monitoring absent judicial or Parole Commission approval, rendering such searches unconstitutional. The government conceded the constitutional violation but argued that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply, as the agency reasonably relied on its own regulations. The trial court rejected this argument and granted the suppression motion.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court held that the exclusionary rule applies because the agency is a law enforcement entity, not a neutral third party like a judge or legislature, and thus should feel the deterrent effect of suppression. The good faith exception does not apply when a law enforcement agency unilaterally authorizes unconstitutional searches based on its own mistaken interpretation of its authority. The court concluded that suppression is warranted to deter systemic constitutional violations. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant purchased a car through an installment sales contract, which was later assigned to a finance company. After the appellant defaulted on payments, the finance company repossessed the vehicle and, through its attorneys, filed a claim in Small Claims Court to recover a deficiency balance. The appellant, representing herself, entered into a settlement agreement to pay the claimed amount in installments. After defaulting on the settlement, a judgment was entered against her, which was satisfied through wage garnishment. Subsequently, the appellant, now represented by counsel, filed a putative class action against the law firm that represented the finance company, alleging violations of various consumer protection laws and abuse of process, based on the assertion that the deficiency debt was not lawfully recoverable due to procedural defects in the repossession process.Previously, the District of Columbia Superior Court dismissed the appellant’s complaint, finding that the law firm was in privity with the finance company for res judicata purposes, and that the complaint failed to state claims under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the District’s Automobile Financing and Repossession Act (AFRA), the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA), the Debt Collection Law (DCL), and for abuse of process. On an earlier appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the attorney-client relationship alone did not establish privity for res judicata and remanded for further analysis of the mutuality of legal interests.On review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the appellant’s DCL claim against the law firm could proceed, as the complaint plausibly alleged that the law firm willfully used deceptive means to collect a debt that was not lawfully owed, including seeking to recover an excessive retaking fee and pursuing a deficiency despite procedural defects. The court found that the law firm and finance company did not have the same legal interest in the subject matter of the prior Small Claims action, so res judicata did not bar the DCL claim. However, the court affirmed dismissal of the claims under AFRA, the UCC, the CPPA, and for abuse of process, finding the complaint insufficient as to those causes of action. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the DCL claim only. View "Bell v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, PA" on Justia Law