Justia District of Columbia Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A couple, who share one child, E.A., sought to modify their child support and custody arrangements following their divorce. The father, Mr. Builta, requested a reduction in his child support payments due to an increase in the mother, Ms. Guzmán’s, income and his own additional dependents. He also sought changes to the custody schedule and restrictions on Ms. Guzmán’s school visits during his custodial time. Ms. Guzmán sought sole legal and physical custody, citing Mr. Builta’s planned move to Maryland and his alleged misuse of tie-breaking authority in decision-making for E.A.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially ordered Mr. Builta to pay $1,736 per month in child support and granted joint legal custody with tie-breaking authority to Mr. Builta. The court later modified the child support to $1,644 per month, using the Holland method to account for the parents' increased combined income. The court found no substantial and material change in circumstances to justify altering the custody arrangement but made minor adjustments to the custody schedule and communication requirements.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the use of the Holland method for calculating child support but found errors in the trial court’s income calculations and procedural steps. The appellate court remanded the case for recalculating child support with correct income data. It also reversed the trial court’s changes to the custody exchange day and the restriction on Ms. Guzmán’s school visits, finding no substantial and material change in circumstances to justify these modifications. The court upheld the trial court’s decision not to alter the joint custody arrangement, emphasizing the child’s best interests and the parents' ability to cooperate despite their conflicts. View "Builta v. Guzman" on Justia Law

Douglass Sloan provided a $60,000 short-term loan to Carlos Allen for property rehabilitation, with a 60-day term and a 20% fixed return rate. If unpaid within 60 days, the loan accrued an additional 2% every subsequent 60 days. The loan was subject to the maximum interest rate allowed by D.C. law if not repaid within 60 days. Sloan sought to collect the debt, leading to a dispute over whether the loan's interest rate was usurious, as D.C. law caps interest rates at 24% per annum.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially ruled that Allen had waived his usury defense by not raising it for nearly seven years. The court awarded Sloan $256,946.46 plus $97,450 in attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the attorney’s fees but remanded the case for reconsideration of the usury defense waiver. The trial court then found no substantial prejudice to Sloan from Allen’s delay and ruled the loan usurious, reducing the award to $39,026.46, the remaining principal, plus the affirmed attorney’s fees.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case again. It upheld the trial court’s findings that Allen had not waived his usury defense and that the loan was usurious, as it effectively charged a 34.7% interest rate in its first year. The court rejected Sloan’s arguments against these findings but agreed that Sloan was entitled to post-judgment interest on the award from the date of the initial October 2020 judgment. The court also dismissed Allen’s cross-appeal, which challenged the validity of the loan and the attorney’s fees, as these issues had been resolved in a prior decision. The case was remanded for the imposition of post-judgment interest on the $39,026.46 award. View "Sloan v. Allen" on Justia Law

Corey Nelson-White was barred from Rhode Island Row, a mixed-use development in Northeast D.C., which includes two buildings at 2300 and 2350 Washington Place NE. The barring notice directed him to stay off the property and grounds of Rhode Island Row. Officers explained the barring notice to Nelson-White, but did not provide him with a copy. Six days later, Nelson-White was found inside a parking garage attached to one of the Rhode Island Row buildings and was arrested for unlawful entry.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted Nelson-White of unlawful entry, finding that he knew or should have known he was barred from the premises, including the parking garage. The trial court based its decision on the barring notice and the officers' instructions, despite Nelson-White's argument that the garage was not clearly marked as part of Rhode Island Row.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found the evidence insufficient to sustain Nelson-White's conviction. The court noted that there was no clear indication that the parking garage was part of the barred premises. The court highlighted the lack of signage or other markers that would inform a reasonable person that the garage was part of Rhode Island Row or 2350 Washington Place. The court concluded that a rational fact-finder could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Nelson-White knew or should have known the garage was included in the barring notice.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed Nelson-White's conviction for unlawful entry, holding that the evidence did not support the conclusion that he was aware or should have been aware that the parking garage was part of the premises he was barred from entering. View "Nelson-White v. United States" on Justia Law

G.W. was convicted of simple assault in 2019 after allegedly grabbing the jacket of a Metropolitan Transit Police Department officer outside the Anacostia Metro Station. G.W. filed a notice of appeal, and the case was remanded to allow the trial court to set aside his conviction under the Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA). Following the trial court's set-aside order and issuance of a new judgment and commitment order, G.W. filed a new notice of appeal, challenging his conviction.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially convicted G.W. of simple assault. G.W. timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was stayed pending the outcome of the en banc decision in Perez Hernandez v. United States, which addressed the elements of an offensive touching assault. After the decision in Perez Hernandez, the stay was lifted, and G.W. sought an indicative ruling for a YRA set-aside. The trial court issued an indicative set-aside order, and the case was remanded. The trial court then issued a set-aside order and an amended judgment and commitment order, which G.W. appealed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that G.W.'s appeal was properly before the court. The court determined that the trial court had not applied the correct elements of an offensive touching assault as defined in Perez Hernandez. Specifically, the trial court did not consider whether G.W.'s actions would offend a person's reasonable sense of personal dignity and whether G.W. acted with the purpose of causing offense or knowing that his actions would cause offense. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to make the necessary findings regarding G.W.'s mens rea and the nature of the touch. The court did not reach G.W.'s Rule 16 claim due to the decision to remand. View "G.W. v. United States" on Justia Law

Karen Richardson obtained a loan in 2008, secured by a promissory note and a deed of trust on her home. After a series of transfers, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC became the holder and servicer of the note. Nationstar appointed members of McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC (MWC) as substitute trustees. In 2015, Nationstar filed for judicial foreclosure, alleging Richardson defaulted on her mortgage. Richardson counterclaimed, challenging Nationstar's standing and alleging violations of lending laws. The Superior Court ruled in favor of Nationstar, and the property was sold in a foreclosure sale.Richardson opposed the ratification of the sale, arguing that Nationstar and MWC provided an incorrect payoff amount, constituting fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. The Superior Court ratified the sale, concluding that Richardson's right to cure the default had expired before the incorrect payoff amount was provided. Richardson's subsequent appeals were dismissed as moot.Richardson then filed a new suit against Nationstar, MWC, and the trustees, alleging wrongful foreclosure, fraud, and misrepresentation. The Superior Court dismissed her claims against Nationstar and others as barred by res judicata, but held her claims against MWC and the trustees in abeyance. Richardson amended her complaint, and the Superior Court dismissed it again on res judicata grounds, believing she had not disputed privity.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's dismissal on the issue of privity. The court held that MWC and the trustees had not sufficiently demonstrated privity with Nationstar to invoke res judicata. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address the privity issue and any other unresolved claims. View "Richardson v. McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of two counts of simple assault and one count of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon. The incidents involved an altercation with his girlfriend, Ms. Williams, and her daughter, M.W. Ms. Williams testified that the appellant slapped her at a Metro station, and later, after an argument, he kicked in her apartment door, punched her, and hit M.W. with a belt. Ms. Williams also claimed the appellant had a gun, which he used to hit her. The police arrived shortly after the incident, and body-worn camera footage captured Ms. Williams's statements and visible injuries.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found the appellant guilty of both counts of simple assault and attempted possession of a prohibited weapon. The court credited Ms. Williams's testimony and found the video evidence, particularly Exhibit 7, significant in showing the appellant holding his belt while running out of the building. The court did not credit the appellant's testimony and found the injuries on Ms. Williams consistent with being hit rather than a fall.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court accepted the United States' concession that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for attempted possession of a prohibited weapon and reversed that conviction. The court found the evidence sufficient to support the assault convictions but held that the trial court erred in admitting Exhibit 7, which was harmful error regarding the conviction for assaulting M.W. Consequently, the court vacated that conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the conviction for assaulting Ms. Williams, finding any error in admitting the video exhibits harmless concerning that conviction. View "Ransom v. United States" on Justia Law

Nine Black, female, low- to moderate-income first-time homebuyers purchased condominium units at the RiverEast at Grandview Condominium complex through the District of Columbia’s Housing Purchase Assistance Program. Shortly after moving in, they encountered severe habitability issues, including foundation problems, sewage, and mold. Their attempts to resolve these issues were unsuccessful, leading them to file a thirteen-count lawsuit against the developers, the District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD), and the RiverEast at Grandview Condominium Owner’s Association. The developers later filed for bankruptcy, and the plaintiffs were forced to evacuate their units.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against the District and the Association for failure to state a claim. The court found that DHCD, as a District agency, was non sui juris and thus incapable of being sued. It also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) because the District could not be considered a “merchant” under the statute. The court dismissed other claims, including violations of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the CPPA claim, holding that the District could be considered a merchant under the statute. The case was remanded for further consideration of whether the District’s trade practices were unfair or deceptive. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the DCHRA, breach of contract, IIED, and negligence claims, finding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts to support these claims. The court also upheld the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint. View "May v. River East at Grandview" on Justia Law

Two employees sued their employers, alleging underpayment for work at a restaurant due to improper wage deductions for meal breaks. The employers deducted thirty minutes twice daily for breakfast and lunch breaks, but the employees claimed their breaks lasted only ten to fifteen minutes each.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bench trial and found in favor of the employers, concluding that the breaks lasted at least twenty minutes. The court based its decision on the credibility of the employees' testimony and other evidence, including testimony from another employee and the restaurant's rules. The employees appealed, arguing that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous and that the breaks should have been classified as compensable rest periods.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that the trial court had clearly erred in its evaluation of the employees' credibility and the evidence. The appellate court noted that the trial court misunderstood key aspects of the employees' testimony and other evidence. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further examination of the evidence.The appellate court did not decide whether the breaks should be classified as rest periods, as this determination depends on the length of the breaks, which the trial court must reassess on remand. The burden of proof remains on the employees to demonstrate that their meal breaks were compensable. View "Sanchez v. Sundely" on Justia Law

Christian Greene, the Ombudsman for the District of Columbia Child & Family Services Agency (CFSA), was terminated from her position and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the District, claiming her termination violated the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). Greene argued that her termination was in retaliation for her disclosures about CFSA's non-compliance with the Foster Youth Statements of Rights and Responsibilities Amendment Act of 2012 (FYAA).The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of CFSA, concluding that Greene's disclosures were merely policy disagreements about the role of the Ombudsman and not protected under the WPA. The court did not address whether Greene reasonably believed her disclosures revealed unlawful activity or whether there was a causal connection between her disclosures and her termination.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that Greene's disclosures were indeed protected under the WPA. The court held that Greene reasonably believed her disclosures revealed violations of the FYAA, which required CFSA to report on the outcomes of investigations and ensure compliance with relevant laws. The court noted that Greene's belief was genuine and reasonable, given the evidence she provided and the context of her role.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court was instructed to determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Greene's WPA-protected disclosures were a cause of her termination. View "Greene v. D.C. Child & Family Services Agency" on Justia Law

Skylar Meinhardt, a former professional soccer player for the Washington Freedom, sustained a left knee injury in 2001 or 2002. Years later, she developed a right knee disability, which she attributed to compensating for her earlier left knee injury. Meinhardt claimed that her altered gait due to the left knee injury led to the deterioration of her right knee, resulting in pain first reported in 2015 and necessitating surgeries in 2016 and 2019.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Meinhardt's workers' compensation claim, mistakenly framing the issue as whether a right knee injury in 2002 was related to the left knee injury in 2001. The ALJ found Meinhardt non-credible, partly because of her prior right knee surgeries in 1996, 1999, and 2001, and because the evidence did not support a right knee injury in 2002. The Compensation Review Board (CRB) affirmed the ALJ's decision, also mischaracterizing the issue as whether a 2002 right knee injury was related to the 2001 left knee injury.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the CRB's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court clarified that the central issue was whether Meinhardt's 2015 right knee disability was causally connected to her 2001-2002 left knee injury. The court found that both the ALJ and CRB had misunderstood the claim, leading to an erroneous denial of benefits. The court also noted that the evidence used to rebut the presumption of compensability, particularly a letter from Dr. Clinton Soppe, was not specific and comprehensive enough, as it incorrectly stated that Meinhardt's right knee pain began acutely in 2016.The case was remanded to the CRB, with instructions to remand it further to the ALJ for reconsideration, focusing on whether the 2015 right knee disability was causally related to the 2001-2002 left knee injury. View "Little v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Services" on Justia Law